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ADJUDICATING IDENTITY
by: Laura Lane-Steele*
ABSTRACT
Legal actors examine identity claims with varying degrees of intensity. For instance, to be considered “female” for the U.S. Census, selfidentification alone is sufficient, and no additional evidence is necessary. To change a sex marker on a birth certificate to “female,” however, self-identification is not enough; some states require people to
show that they do not have a penis to be considered “female.” Similar
examples of discrepancies in the type and amount of evidence considered for identity claims abound across identities and areas of law. Yet
legal actors rarely acknowledge that they are adjudicating identity in the
first place, much less explain or justify the varying levels of scrutiny
exacted upon identity claims. This Article attempts to make sense of
identity adjudication by providing a taxonomy that explains why some
identity claims are interrogated more than others. Taking a broad view
of identity adjudication, it examines three types of laws (data-collection,
anti-discrimination, and benefit laws) as well as four identity categories
(religion, sexual orientation, sex, and race) and concludes that both the
type of law at issue and the identity category affect how an identity
claim is adjudicated. It then argues that across identities and types of
laws, legal actors are often adjudicating identity without proper attention to the particular legal context and examining the wrong type of
identity evidence in light of the specific law at issue. This context-detached approach to identity adjudication produces inconsistent and incoherent results; it can also impinge on privacy interests and reinforce
problematic stereotypes. This Article calls for a context-informed approach to identity adjudication, where the question of identity is linked
to the function of the specific law rather than treated as an independent
and stable “truth” about an individual.
https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V9.I2.1
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INTRODUCTION

Identity has been adjudicated in the court of public opinion with
increasing frequency over the past decade. Rachel Dolezal’s claim to a
biracial identity was generally accepted in her community because of
her appearance, but when her ancestry came to light, most people rejected her racial self-identification and deemed her to be white.1 Professor Andrea Smith self-identifies as Native American, but because
she has been unable to show that neither she nor any of her relatives
1. See ROGERS BRUBAKER, TRANS: GENDER
IDENTITIES 1–3 (2016).
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are citizens of a tribe, her identity claim has been largely rejected.2
Sex is also publicly adjudicated. In 2015, Caitlyn Jenner came out as a
transgender woman,3 and Demi Lovato recently disclosed that they
identify as non-binary.4 Most people treat these changes in sex selfidentification as legitimate, and failing to accept these individuals’ sex
identities is viewed as discriminatory in many circles.5 Whether an individual’s identity claim is accepted by society can have tremendous
effects on that individual’s life—Dolezal has become a social pariah
and lost her jobs as the chapter president for the Spokane NAACP
and as an instructor of Africana Studies at Eastern Washington University. Jenner, on the other hand, ran for governor of California.6
Identity adjudication is also happening in the mundane moments of
our everyday lives. Problems can arise when others adjudicate our
identities improperly, unnecessarily, or in ways that conflict with our
self-identification. Two examples from my life follow. On multiple occasions, when I have entered the women’s restroom, employees of the
establishment or other patrons have adjudicated my sex to be male
based on my appearance. They then followed me into the restroom to
inform me that I was in the wrong restroom. At the airport security
checkpoint, the full body scanner machines require the TSA agents to
indicate whether the subject being scanned is male or female. TSA
agents frequently adjudicate my sex as male, which causes the machine to alert and sometimes results in me going through additional
screening.
2. See Sarah Viren, The Native Scholar Who Wasn’t, N.Y. TIMES, https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/05/25/magazine/cherokee-native-american-andrea-smith.html
(May 28, 2021) [https://perma.cc/TW7Q-JB3F]. Other examples of racial self-identifications being adjudicated include the controversies over Natasha Bannan and Jessica
Krug. See Raul A. Reyes, Who’s Really Latina? A Recent Controversy Draws Outrage
Over Identity, Appropriation, NBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/who-s-really-latina-recent-controversy-draws-outrageover-identity-n1258141 [https://perma.cc/E35F-Q5RW] (discussing Natasha Bannan,
who identified as Latina, despite not having Latin American ancestry and Jessica
Krug, who previously identified as Black but then revealed that she had mispresented
her ancestry).
3. Buzz Bissinger, Caitlyn Jenner: The Full Story, VANITY FAIR (June 25, 2015),
https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2015/06/caitlyn-jenner-bruce-cover-annie-leibovitz [https://perma.cc/JW72-HAW7].
4. Demi Lovato Is Non-Binary and Is Changing Pronouns to They/Them, Singer
Announces, BBC NEWS (May 19, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat57169541 [https://perma.cc/U69Z-W2PF].
5. New Poll Shows Americans Overwhelmingly Oppose Anti-Transgender Laws,
PBS NEWSHOUR (Apr. 16, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/
new-poll-shows-americans-overwhelmingly-oppose-anti-transgender-laws [https://
perma.cc/645S-ZUCC].
6. See BRUBAKER, supra note 1, at 3–4 (contrasting negative reaction to Dolezal
with positive reactions to Jenner); Jennifer Medina & Maggie Haberman, Caitlyn Jenner Announces Run for California Governor, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/04/23/us/politics/caitlyn-jenner-california-governor.html (Apr.
26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/BHV4-4ZMK].

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-2\TWL206.txt

270

unknown

Seq: 4

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

10-MAR-22

14:18

[Vol. 9

As these examples show, identity adjudication is both ubiquitous
and consequential. Sometimes less obviously, but at least as frequently, identity is formally adjudicated in law. In some contexts, people are taken at their word that they are a particular identity, and
other times, they have to put forth more evidence to prove their identity claim. For example, self-identification is enough for the Census;
you check a box indicating your race, sex, marital status, etc., and you
don’t need to provide any other evidence.7 But if you seek asylum in
the United States based on your sexual orientation, self-identification
would not be sufficient; you would need to provide additional evidence, like proof of prior same-sex relationships, corroborating testimony from friends and family, or evidence that you faced homophobic
harassment.8 Some identity claims are closely scrutinized while other
are not.9 Yet legal actors do not usually acknowledge that they are
adjudicating identity in this way, much less explain why some identity
claims are examined more closely than others.
This Article seeks to systematically understand and make visible
identity adjudication in the law. It brings to the surface the implicit,
unidentified, and unconscious factors legal actors use to adjudicate
identity and provides a taxonomy of identity adjudication. Specifically, it develops this taxonomy by examining three types of laws—(1)
data-collection laws (like the Census), (2) anti-discrimination laws
(like Title VII), and (3) “benefit” laws, which involve individuals asking or petitioning a state actor to affirmatively do something on their
behalf10—and four identity categories: (1) race, (2) sex, (3) sexual orientation, and (4) religion.
Two patterns emerge that tend to affect how identity claims are adjudicated. The first pattern goes to the type of law at issue. For datacollection laws, the evidentiary burden for identity claims is low, and
self-identification alone is generally sufficient.11 This burden increases
with anti-discrimination laws and is at its highest with benefit laws.12
For example, self-identification is typically sufficient to prove racial
identity in the context of a data-collection law;13 for a benefit law,
however, legal actors require more, such as ancestral evidence or prior
consistent racial self-identifications.14 The second pattern goes to the
type of identity at issue. Identities the law treats as immutable (race
and sex) are more intensely scrutinized than the identities the law
7. E.g., About Race, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/topics/population/race/about.html (Dec. 3, 2021) [https://perma.cc/E6UZ-PZJ9].
8. See generally infra Part III(C)(1).
9. See generally infra Part III(C)(1).
10. This Article’s definition of “benefit” law is explained more fully infra in Part
III(C).
11. See infra Part III(A).
12. See generally infra Part III.
13. E.g., About Race, supra note 7.
14. See infra Part III(C).
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treats as more mutable (sexual orientation and religion). For example,
sex adjudication for a benefit law generally requires proof of certain
biological traits.15 But religious identity for a benefit law is usually
accepted if the individual can provide some corroborating evidence of
their identity claim.16 Thus, (1) the immutability of the identity category and (2) the type of law both affect the way legal actors treat
identity claims.
Making explicit this taxonomy of identity adjudication reveals a
problematic pattern across identities and areas of law—namely, that
legal actors tend to adjudicate identity in what I call a “context-detached,” rather than a “context-informed,” manner. A context-detached approach neither examines why the particular law asks about
the identity in the first place nor considers how the purpose or function of the law may influence how identity should be adjudicated.
Context-detached identity adjudication is not disciplined or regulated
by the applicable law; rather, it is guided by whatever legal actors
think they “know” about particular identities. Subjective and unarticulated definitions of identity—formed by the particular legal actor’s
social, cultural, and political positionalities—dominate the context-detached approach to identity adjudication. For example, a legal actor
who adopts this approach may define a “woman” as someone with
breasts who ascriptively appears to be a woman (at least to that legal
actor) and then applies that definition across different areas of law,
regardless of whether breasts or ascriptive factors matter to the law.
A context-detached approach to identity adjudication is problematic for at least two reasons. First, and most obviously, it can produce
results that are doctrinally inconsistent or at odds with the purpose of
the law. Consider an example from anti-discrimination law. In racial
discrimination cases, some courts adjudicate the plaintiff’s “actual”
race.17 In these cases, courts may examine the plaintiff’s accent, skin
color, or ancestry to determine her racial identity for themselves.18 Or
they may dismiss a claim from a plaintiff who was mistreated based on
a misperceived racial identity.19 But when a plaintiff brings a claim for
sexual orientation discrimination, courts are not typically concerned
with determining whether the plaintiff is “actually” gay or not; they
don’t care whether the plaintiff self-identifies as gay, is in a same-sex
relationship, or conforms to stereotypes associated with gay people.20
15. See infra Part III(C)(4).
16. See infra Part III(C)(2); see also Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty., 765 F.3d 480, 487
(5th Cir. 2014) (example of a court accepting a party’s religious identity based solely
on their testimony).
17. D. Wendy Greene, Categorically Black, White, or Wrong: “Misperception Discrimination” and the State of Title VII Protection, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 87, 90
(2013).
18. See infra Part III(B)(3).
19. See infra Part III(B)(3).
20. See infra Part III(B)(1).
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Instead, courts focus on the content of the discrimination or perception of the discriminator and ask whether the discriminatory conduct
was motivated by sexual orientation.21 Thus, a plaintiff who self-identifies as straight but who was misperceived as gay by his discriminator
could probably sustain a claim, but a Hispanic plaintiff misperceived
as Black may have her claim dismissed based on her identity.
There is no doctrinal reason to treat these claims differently; the
same statute and the same analytical framework apply to both race
discrimination claims and sexual orientation discrimination claims.22
As explained further in Part IV, the applicable anti-discrimination
laws do not require courts to determine the plaintiff’s “true” identity—rather, the discriminator’s perception of the plaintiff’s identity
or the cause of the discriminatory behavior should guide the identity
inquiry. Therefore, when courts attempt to determine the “actual”
race of a plaintiff, they are engaging in context-detached identity adjudication. Such an approach creates doctrinal inconsistency within antidiscrimination law because some courts, like those addressing sexual
orientation claims, are not concerned with the “actual” identity of the
plaintiff. Moreover, this approach can harm individual plaintiffs and
undercut the purposes of anti-discrimination law on the whole. Antidiscrimination laws are meant to provide remedies to plaintiffs who
were mistreated based on a protected category.23 When courts deny
these plaintiffs’ claims based in whole or in part on the court’s adjudication of the plaintiff’s “true” identity, the goals of anti-discrimination
law are not served.
The second problem with a context-detached approach is that it can
result in the over-interrogation of identity by requiring too much identity evidence to fulfill the function of the law. I fully explore the consequences of over-interrogation in other work,24 but I summarize two
primary harms here. First, making identity claims dependent on unnecessary identity evidence may infringe upon individuals’ privacy and
dignity interests. Consider some examples of highly sensitive identity
evidence legal actors either require or examine when adjudicating
identity: ancestral background from services like 23andMe, the
makeup of someone’s primary or secondary sex characteristics, past
sexual and romantic history, and the hormone treatments someone is
receiving or has received. Using this identity evidence to adjudicate
identity, when this evidence is not necessary considering the law at
issue, needlessly impinges on privacy and dignity interests.
21. See infra Part III(B)(1).
22. Kindall James, Thomas McGoey, II & Courtney Harper Turkington, U.S. Supreme Court Rules That Federal Anti-Discrimination Law Protects Gay and Transgender Workers, JDSUPRA (June 16, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/u-ssupreme-court-rules-that-federal-94054/ [https://perma.cc/5EEZ-RZGU].
23. See infra Part IV(B)(2).
24. See Laura Lane-Steele (manuscript in progress) (on file with author) [hereinafter Working Manuscript].
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Second, over-interrogation of identity can reinforce problematic
definitions of identity that unnecessarily essentialize identity. For example, when a court concludes that someone is a particular race based
on the way they look and speak, that court is using the power of the
law to declare that certain ways of looking and speaking are essential
qualities of a particular race.25 Similarly, a legal actor who denies
someone’s claim that she is a lesbian based on her prior marriage to a
man is helping construct an overly rigid and false definition what it
means to be a lesbian.26
This Article calls for a context-informed approach to identity adjudication. Unlike a context-detached approach, a context-informed approach understands the identity question to depend on why that
particular law is asking the identity question in the first place. It begins the identity inquiry by locating the function or purpose of the
applicable law. It then asks whether identity adjudication is necessary
at all, and if so, what definition of identity would best serve those
purposes.
Other work has identified how law determines identity claims and
has critiqued specific flaws in how legal actors determine identity, but
the scholarship tends to focus on one area of law, one identity, and/or
one model of identity adjudication.27 This Article expands on this
25. See infra Part III(B)(3).
26. See infra notes 169–78 and accompanying text. My future work examines this
problem of over-interrogation in more depth and explores how identity adjudication
does not merely describe or identify pre-existing identity categories—but that it is
helping produce the categories and the cultural meanings associated with those categories. See Working Manuscript, supra note 24. Other scholars have explored how
legal classifications of race, sex, and sexual orientation construct those identities. See,
e.g., IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 7
(1996); LAURA E. GÓMEZ, MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN
AMERICAN RACE 54, 63 (2007) (analyzing how law defined racial categories in the
nineteenth century); Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 747
(2008) (arguing that legal rules that govern sex classifications “do not simply discover
and describe maleness and femaleness but instead produce two populations marked
with maleness and femaleness”); Stefan Vogler, Legally Queer: The Construction of
Sexuality in LGBQ Asylum Claims, 50 L. & SOC’Y REV. 856, 884 (2016) (arguing that
legal process by which people seek asylum based on sexual orientation “is both regulatory and generative of sexual identities and that the law plays a powerful role in
shaping sexual identity”); see also GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR,
SORTING THINGS OUT: CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1999).
27. See, e.g., Nancy Leong, Judicial Erasure of Mixed-Race Discrimination, 59 AM.
U. L. REV. 469, 471 (2010) [hereinafter Judicial Erasure] (“[A]ntidiscrimination jurisprudence [is] inhospitable to claims brought by individuals who allege that they were
discriminated against because they were perceived as multiracial.”); D. Wendy
Greene, Categorically Black, White, or Wrong: “Misperception Discrimination” and
the State of Title VII Protection, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 87, 129 (2013) (arguing that
courts’ rejection of misperception claims in Title VII cases “is categorically wrong”);
Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 104, 132
(2017) [hereinafter Protected Class] (critiquing courts’ refusal “to consider discrimination claims by plaintiffs who have not proven membership in a protected class” in
anti-discrimination law); Leora F. Eisenstadt, Fluid Identity Discrimination, 52 AM.
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scholarship by examining legal identity adjudication across areas of
law and identity categories and by extracting patterns that exist
outside of any one doctrinal or identity silo. It also expands on the
scholarship’s critiques of identity adjudication and demonstrates how
context-detached identity adjudication is a systemic problem in law
rather than a problem limited by category of law or identity.28
This Article is both broad and narrow. The broad scope allows me
to build the taxonomy of identity adjudication and identify the problem of context-detached identity adjudication. But the taxonomy also
raises many issues about identity adjudication that I do not address in
this Article.29 For instance, the taxonomy sheds light on dominant societal discourses regarding identity and how those discourses are implemented through law. It can also elucidate how legal identity
adjudication enforces identity-based hierarchies.30 This Article lays
the groundwork for, but does not take on, these questions. Also, this
Article does not claim to be an exhaustive examination of all types of
identity adjudication in the law. It does not address, for example, disability, citizenship, or familial identity categories or the related laws
that adjudicate those identities.31 Future work can build on, and imBUS. L.J. 789, 791 (2015) (discussing how courts struggle to adjudicate fluid race and
sex identity claims in the context of anti-discrimination law); Jessica A. Clarke, Identity and Form, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 747, 750 (2015) [hereinafter Identity and Form]
(discussing formal identity in the content of race, sex, family, and citizenship); Sonia
K. Kayal & Jessica Y. Jung, The Gender Panopticon: AI, Gender, and Design Justice,
68 UCLA L. REV. 692, 692 (2021) (documenting how legal and non-legal actors employ AI technologies to determine sex identity); Russell K. Robinson, Masculinity as
Prison: Sexual Identity, Race, and Incarceration, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1309 (2011)
(explaining how jail officials determine the sexuality and transgender status of
inmates).
28. Other scholars have argued that legal definitions of identity, and whether the
law should use identity in the first place, depend on the context, i.e., the function of
the law and how identity serves that purpose. See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them,
and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894, 902 (2019) (suggesting a “contextual approach to
debates over sex and gender regulation” within the context of non-binary gender and
providing three potential models that regulate sex differently depending on the context); Lauren Sudeall, Identity as Proxy, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1605, 1609–11 (2015)
(arguing that equal protection doctrine should abandon identity as determinative of
the level of scrutiny courts apply in favor of an approach that better serves the purposes and values of equal protection law). This Article begins the work of expanding
these arguments across identities and legal areas, work that I am continuing in my
works in progress.
29. This Article is the first in a series of articles about identity adjudication. In my
future work, I plan to address many questions this Article leaves unanswered.
30. Other work has identified how the law’s creation and maintenance of certain
categories has been crucial in maintaining inequality. See, e.g., LÓPEZ, supra note 26,
at 139 (showing how legal adjudication of whiteness served to uphold white
supremacy); Dean Spade, Mutilating Gender, in THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES
READER 315, 320 (Susan Stryker & Stephen Whittle eds., 2006) (arguing that law’s
reliance on the bio-medical model of sex identity privileges cisgender identity as natural and transgender identity as illness that needs to be cured).
31. Regarding disability, scholars have argued that legal actors over-interrogate
disability claims. That is, legal actors require more identity evidence than necessary in
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prove upon, this taxonomy by including additional laws and identity
categories. Finally, this Article argues for a context-informed approach to identity adjudication, where identity inquiries are informed
by the function or purpose of the law at issue; however, it does not
take a normative stance on what the proper function or purpose of a
law should be. These debates are too expansive and complex for this
Article to tackle. This Article makes an argument about the proper
process of identity adjudication—i.e., a context-informed approach.
The remainder of the Article is structured as follows. Part II defines
the types of identity evidence used to prove an identity claim and provides background on immutable versus mutable identities. Part III details the taxonomy of identity adjudication that I have introduced
here. Specifically, it examines identity claims in the context of datacollection laws and explains how self-identification is almost always
sufficient for these laws. Next, it addresses anti-discrimination laws
and provides a descriptive account of how courts adjudicate identity in
the context of these laws. It then addresses benefit laws and highlights
how identity claims are typically the most highly scrutinized, particularly with race and sex. Lastly, it offers possible explanations for why
the type of law and the mutability of identity affect how closely an
identity is examined. Part IV turns to the normative critique of the
taxonomy and argues that identity is often adjudicated without proper
attention to the purpose or function of the particular law at issue. The
Article ends with a brief conclusion.
II. DEFINITIONS

AND

MUTABILITY

A. Types of Identity Evidence
To make the following discussions of identity adjudication more coherent and efficient, this Article uses the following terms to refer to
certain categories of identity evidence. By “identity evidence,” I mean
the documents, traits, or information legal actors use to determine
someone’s identity.
1. Ascriptive evidence. Ascriptive evidence refers to both physical
appearance and the performative aspects of identity. Based on
one or both of these, individuals are involuntarily assigned or
ascribed an identity by third parties. For instance, a third party
may assign someone a racial identity when she “interprets another person’s visible, physical features to correlate with a set of
features she identifies with a certain race or ethnic group.”32
light of the purpose of the ADA. See, e.g., Katherine Macfarlane, Disability Without
Documentation, 90 FORDHAM L. REV. 59 (2021) (arguing that requiring employees to
provide medical documentation of their disability before receiving an accommodation
conflicts with the ADA’s purpose).
32. Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by
Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1145 (2004) [hereinafter
Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity].
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Her racial assignment also may take into account certain “dialects, aesthetics, and mannerisms” that she associates with a certain race.33 Sex, sexual orientation, and religion34 may also be
ascribed based on some combination of physical appearance
and behavior.35
2. Documentary evidence. Documentary evidence refers to prior
articulations of someone’s identity, typically, but not exclusively, in written form. This category includes an individual’s
prior self-identification on a form, like an employment application or insurance form, and recordings by third parties of an
individual’s ascriptive identity, like a birth certificate designating someone’s race.36
3. Ancestral evidence. Ancestral evidence focuses on evidence of
familial lineage and includes things like DNA evidence, ancestry, and genealogies.
4. Biological evidence. Biological evidence refers to traits like
chromosomes, primary and secondary sex characteristics, and
other things tied to the body that are not encompassed under
ascriptive evidence.
33. Id. at 1158. This brief discussion does not capture the complexity of identity
performance or ascriptive identity, which has been widely discussed in the scholarship. DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE?: RETHINKING RACE IN
“POST-RACIAL” AMERICA 1 (1st ed. 2013) (discussing how racial judgments are often
based on the extent to which a person conforms their behavior to that which is stereotypically associated with a certain race); John O. Calmore, Random Notes of an Integration Warrior, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1441, 1450 (1997) (“Even dark-skinned, nappyheaded African Americans like me can pass sociologically and culturally if we have
the right history of socialization, the right credentials, a respectable job, an affluent
income, and a proper street address or zip code.”); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati,
Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1289 (2000); RICHARD THOMPSON
FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 62 (2005) (explaining how a third party often
performs the subject’s identity back to the subject; for instance when a white department store clerk follows a Black man around the store, she is performing his identity
back to him).
34. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 779–80, 929 (2002).
35. Some scholars have included individuals’ biological and ancestral makeups in
their definitions of ascriptive identity. See Identity and Form, supra note 27, at 757.
For this Article, I have found it more useful to create separate categories for those
aspects of identity. Biology and ancestry often affect physical appearance, but the two
do not always correlate. For instance, an ascriptive model of identity (as I have defined it) may result in a transgender person’s sex being adjudicated as female, while
under a biological one, it may not be. And multi-racial individuals are often not perceived to be of the racial category that matches their ancestral makeup. See infra Part
(III)(B).
36. Jessica Clarke has discussed a closely related model of identity, called formal
identity, which she defines as an identity that “comes into being through the execution of a formality by the parties laying claim to a particular identity.” Identity and
Form, supra note 27, at 770. Her article focuses on “formalities that constitute identity
statuses for legal purposes, rather than those thought to merely reflect a status.” Id.
This Article understands both as documentary evidence—for example, an individual’s
sex marker on their birth certificate can reflect their sex, and when an individual
changes that sex marker under state law, they become that sex under that state’s law.
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5. Self-identification. Self-identification refers to the identity to
which the individual has laid claim to at the time of the litigation, controversy, point of data-collection, or other event in
question. This category does not include a person’s prior representations of their identity, unless otherwise noted.
These forms of identity evidence are not mutually exclusive, and in
some cases, they may completely overlap. For example, a family genealogy can be considered both ancestral evidence and documentary evidence. A birth certificate can be considered either documentary
evidence or ascriptive evidence because it represents the sex a third
party assigned to the individual at birth. Moreover, not all types of
evidence apply to all categories of identity. For example, biological
and ancestral evidence are not relevant to the adjudication of sexual
orientation and most types of religious identity claims. Finally, I am
not committed to these definitions of identity evidence; these definitions are not the point of this Article. Nor am I arguing that any of
these types of identity evidence are normatively constitutive of any
particular identity. In other words, having XY chromosomes does not
make someone “male” as a normative matter. Indeed, claiming that
certain types of identity evidence are definitional qualities of an identity would be antithetical to a project that advocates for a contextinformed approach to defining identity. Rather, I find that these terms
promote efficiency and consistency when discussing identity adjudication in such a broad manner.
B. Mutability
Because the taxonomy introduced in this Article finds that “immutable” identities (race and sex) tend to receive closer scrutiny than
more “mutable” identities (sexual orientation and religion), a brief explanation of what I mean by immutability is in order. Mutability of
identity in this Article means the degree to which an individual can
chose, or validly change, their identity in the eyes of the law.37 There
are different tiers of immutability, and identities are not simply immutable or mutable. Identities that are perceived to be rooted in nature
or biology are generally deemed strictly immutable, i.e., the identity
cannot be changed.38 Race and ethnicity fall into this category of immutability.39 For many decades, sex was also strictly immutable;40
37. This Article focuses on mutability of identity in law as opposed to societal
perceptions of immutability. Societal and legal understandings of immutability no
doubt inform each other, but societal definitions are too context-dependent, unstable,
and contested to conduct this cross-identity, cross-law analysis.
38. See Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 14–15 (2015).
However, immutable identities or traits do not have to be connected to biology or
ancestry. For example, the law considers illegitimacy to be an immutable trait. Weber
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175–76 (1972).
39. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[R]ace, like gender and illegitimacy . . . is
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however, this has started to change with the gradual judicial and legislative recognition that an individual can change their sex,41 usually by
changing their primary or secondary sex characteristics.42
The next tier of immutability, which some call the “new immutability,” includes identities or traits that the law understands as capable of
being changed but that law should not require or incentivize people to
change.43 These traits “are so central to a person’s identity that it
would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing
to change them, regardless of how easy that change might be physically.”44 Courts have placed sexual orientation in this category of immutability.45 Religion also falls in this category. People can, and often
do, change their religion, but the law does not require or incentivize
changing one’s religion.46
This discussion of the varying degrees of mutability of identity is not
an endorsement of their legitimacy. Many scholars have convincingly
critiqued the stability of the immutable/mutable distinction and its relevance to equality law.47 Rather, this immutable/mutable distinction
in the law is relevant because of its role in explaining the taxonomy
for identity adjudication.
III. A TAXONOMY

OF

IDENTITY ADJUDICATION

This Part develops the taxonomy of identity adjudication identified
in the Introduction and reveals how both the type of law and the idenan immutable characteristic which its possessors are powerless to escape or set aside.”
(citation omitted)).
40. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion).
41. See Lisa Mottet, Modernizing State Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to Ensure Accurate Gender Markers on Birth Certificates: A Good Government Approach
to Recognizing the Lives of Transgender People, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 373, 376
(2013).
42. The mutability of sex is limited, though, in the sense that it is generally only
able to be changed once in order to align the body with the mind or soul. In the eyes
of law, the “actual” sex of the individual resides in the mind or soul and is still understood to be immutable. See Yoshino, supra note 34, at 922–23 (2002); Paisley Currah,
Gender Pluralisms Under the Transgender Umbrella, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 3, 4
(Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang & Shannon Price Minter eds., 2006).
43. Clarke, supra note 38, at 4–5.
44. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring).
45. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 436–39 (Conn. 2008)
(holding that sexual orientation is immutable because of its centrality to a person’s
identity and can be “altered[,] [if at all,] only at the expense of significant damage to
the individual’s sense of self” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
46. Indeed, the First Amendment prevents the government from punishing or incentivizing changing religions. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
47. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility
Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, 108 YALE L.J. 485, 487 (1998);
Clarke, supra note 38, at 10; Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of
Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 519–21
(1994).
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tity category affect how an identity claim is examined. First, it addresses data-collection laws and demonstrates how, currently, they
almost exclusively rely on self-identification. For race, one of the more
immutable identities, there are some exceptions. Specifically, a third
party’s ascriptive assessment of someone’s race can trump self-identification, but it is not clear how often this happens in practice, or if it
happens at all. Then, this Part turns to identity adjudication in antidiscrimination cases. It illustrates how courts are more likely to focus
on a plaintiff’s “actual” identity in cases involving race and sex. Finally, it turns to benefit laws and shows how legal scrutiny of identity
claims is highest in this category of laws and also how the proof requirements for immutable identities (race and sex) are particularly onerous. The following is a visual representation of how identity
category and type of law affect identity interrogation.48

48. As currently constituted, this taxonomy does not completely account for how
other intersecting identities affect how an identity claim is adjudicated—i.e., how
scrutiny of one identity (identity A) is affected by occupation of another privileged or
marginalized identity (identity B). For instance, the current version of this taxonym
does not fully address how race might affect sex identity or religious identity determinations or how sex and race might affect sexuality determinations. See Kimberle
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Policies, 1 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139–40 (1989) (arguing that different identities intersect to produce different experiences and forms of discrimination). Other scholars have discussed how intersecting identities affect identity determinations in discrete legal
contexts. E.g., HEATH FOGG DAVIS, BEYOND TRANS: DOES GENDER MATTER?
112–13 (2017) (discussing how women of color are more likely to have their sex identity questioned than white women in the context of sex-segregated sports); Adeel
Mohammadi, Note, Sincerity, Religious Questions, and the Accommodation Claims of
Muslim Prisoners, 129 YALE L. J. 1836, 1841–42 (showing how courts tend to require
more than just “religious sincerity” when Muslims seek religious accommodations in
prison, even though the First Amendment technically bars more searching inquires); see also Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination
in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 157, 163–66 (1998) (showing how
performative evidence of white identity took different forms depending on sex—for
men, for example, acting white meant exercising rights like voting). I am still studying
how intersecting identities affect identity determinations in a systemic way. In my
current work in progress specifically, I am exploring how occupation of one or more
marginalized identities can exacerbate the harm caused by the context-detached approach to identity adjudication.
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More Scrutiny

Race

Sex

Sexual Orientation

Religion
Less Scrutiny

Data Collection

Anti-discrimination

Less Scrutiny

Benefit

More Scrutiny

A. Data-Collection Laws
“Data-collection” laws are just that: mechanisms that govern or
conduct the collection of data. The primary goal of data-collection
laws is to collect data, but they all have secondary functions, depending on how the identity information is used. Census data, for example,
is used for many purposes, including determining how a wide variety
of federal resources are allocated and tracking patterns of race and
sex discrimination.49 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) also collects data on race and sex to identify workplace discrimination.50 But no matter the purpose for which the
identity data is used, identity is determined almost exclusively by selfidentification. For instance, the Census gathers information on racial,
ethnic, and sex identity based on self-identification alone.51 Sexual ori49. U.S. DEP’T COM., QUESTIONS PLANNED FOR THE 2020 CENSUS AND AMERICOMMUNITY SURVEY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 11, 41, 71 (2018), https://
www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/2020/operations/planned-questions2020-acs.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN2Z-SMYM].
50. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 2019 AND 2020 EEO-1 COMPONENT 1 DATA COLLECTION INSTRUCTION BOOKLET, EEOCDATA.ORG 10–12 (2019),
https://eeocdata.org/pdfs/EEO-1%20Component%201%20Instruction%20Booklet.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4LC-WUBV].
51. Id. at 11–15. The Census treats Native American status as a racial category and
allows participants to write the name of their enrolled or principal tribe. Id. at 11. The
Census Bureau does not cross-reference these responses against tribes’ official enrollment lists. See id.; U.S. DEP’T OF COM., TRIBAL CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU 24 (2015), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/dec/2020_tribal_consultation_handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CSKVGGC].
CAN
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entation data is also captured via self-identification in both the Census52 and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”)’s
telephone survey.53
Religious identity is also determined through self-identification.
The Census does not currently ask about religious affiliation, but
when it used to, respondents checked the box corresponding to their
religious identities.54 Other countries’ censuses collect data on religious practices based on self-identification.55 In the United States,
think-tanks and other non-governmental research organizations collect this information, and self-identification is always sufficient.56
This is not to say that data-collection mechanisms permit unrestrained freedom of identity self-determination. Many of these mechanisms limit the options within each identity category. The Census, for
example, has only two options for sex: male or female.57 People who
52. The 2020 Census did not ask respondents to check a box corresponding to
their sexual orientation; it asked respondents to define their relationship with their
cohabiting partner as an opposite sex husband/wife/spouse, opposite sex unmarried
partner, same-sex husband/wife/spouse, or same-sex unmarried partner. U.S. DEP’T
OF COM., TEST QUESTIONNAIRE FOR 2020 CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1, 3 (2018),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4425959x-Test-Questionnaire-for-2020Census.html#document/p3/a414347 [https://perma.cc/FG8S-FMMR].
53. Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Systems (BRFSS): Years Survey Included
Sexual and Gender Minority (SGM)-Related Questions 2014 - Present, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/OMH/resource-center/hcps-and-researchers/data-tools/sgm-clearinghouse/brfss
(Dec. 1, 2021, 7:02 PM) [https://perma.cc/RXD9-9HPV].
54. Congress passed a statute in 1976 that prohibited the Census Bureau from
requiring disclosures of religious affiliation. 13 U.S.C. § 221(c). Although the Bureau
could ask people an optional question about their religious affiliations, it has chosen
not to due to separation of church and state concerns. Anne Farris Rosen, A Brief
History of Religion and the U.S. Census, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 26, 2010), https://
www.pewforum.org/2010/01/26/a-brief-history-of-religion-and-the-u-s-census/ [https://
perma.cc/3NEA-ED22] (quoting a former Census Bureau director who stated that
“[t]he decision not to add this question is based essentially on the fact that asking such
a question in the decennial census, in which replies are mandatory, would appear to
infringe upon the traditional separation of church and [s]tate”).
55. See, e.g., TOM EVANS & MIKE WELSBY, OFF. FOR NAT’L STAT., RELIGION,
EDUCATION AND WORK IN ENGLAND AND WALES 21 (2020), https://www.ons.gov.uk/
peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/articles/religioneducationandworkinenglandandwales/february2020 [https://perma.cc/VQX2-M7EP] (discussing
the United Kingdom’s census).
56. For instance, the Pew Research Center’s Religious Landscape Study asked
participants: “What is your present religion, if any? Are you Protestant, Roman Catholic, Mormon, Orthodox such as Greek or Russian Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, atheist, agnostic, something else, or nothing in particular?” PEW RSCH.
CTR., 2014 RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE STUDY: MAIN SURVEY OF NATIONALLY REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF ADULTS FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE 7 (2014), https://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2016/10/25142557/RLS-IIQuestionnaire-for-5th-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DD9-EE7K].
57. U.S. DEP’T OF COM., 2010 CENSUS QUESTIONNAIRE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1
(2010), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/programs-surveys/decennial/technical-documentation/questionnaires/2010questionnaire.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZC9T4XBN].
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do not fit neatly into either category cannot accurately claim their
identity.58 Additionally, until 2000, the Census instructions limited respondents to one racial category, so individuals who identified as multiracial could not select more than one race.59 Thus, data-collection
laws do not allow people to identify however they want, but within the
options these laws create, identity claims are generally not questioned.
However, data-collection laws have not always relied predominately on self-identification, especially for racial identity. When the
Census Bureau began collecting information on racial identity, Census
administrators would designate a respondent’s race based on their appearance.60 In other words, ascriptive evidence, not self-identification,
determined racial identity. Similarly, before 2006, the EEOC instructed employers to assign their employees a racial category based
on employees’ visual appearance.61 Even today, there are some exceptions to the general rule that racial self-identification is sufficient for
data-collection laws. For instance, although self-identification is the
EEOC’s preferred method of collecting identity data, the agency permits “the person attempting to secure information regarding race, sex,
or ethnic affiliation” to reclassify an employee’s identity “where the
declaration by the applicant or employee is patently false.”62 How58. See Sonia K. Katyal, The Numerus Clausus of Sex, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 389,
400–01 (2017) (describing how law limits the options for sex designations to only two
categories (male and female) and comparing this to the numerus clauses principle in
property that limits the categories of property).
59. Alaina R. Walker, Choosing To Be Multiracial in America: The Sociopolitical
Implications of the “Check All That Apply” Approach to Race Adopted in the 2000
U.S. Census, 21 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 61, 64–66 (2011).
60. Id. at 64.
61. See Joseph Z. Fleming, I Believe There Is Something Out There Watching Us;
Unfortunately, It’s the Government: An Analysis of the EEOC’s “EEO-1” and
OFCCP Reporting Requirements, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION, Nov. 30–Dec. 2, 2006, at *1225, SM027 ALI-ABA
1209. Camille Gear Rich has discussed this relatively recent shift in the law’s preference for self-identification over ascriptive evidence for racial identity determinations.
See Camille Gear Rich, Elective Race: Recognizing Race Discrimination in the Era of
Racial Self-Identification, 102 GEO. L.J. 1501, 1505 (2014) [hereinafter Elective Race].
62. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL
§ 632.3(b)(2)(iii) (2006), 2006 WL 4672862. The EEOC does not explain how an employer should go about deciding when an employee’s declaration is “patently false,”
but considering that the EEOC’s pre-2006 policy used ascriptive race, it is reasonable
to assume that employers can reclassify employees when employers’ perception of
their employees’ identity does not match the employees’ self-identification. EEOC
guidance also instructs employers to use “observer identification” “if an employee
declines to self-identify his or her race and/or ethnicity.” U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 2019 AND 2020 EEO-1 COMPONENT 1 DATA COLLECTION INSTRUCTION BOOKLET, EEOCDATA.ORG 11 (2019–2020), https://eeocdata.org/pdfs/EEO1%20Component%201%20Instruction%20Booklet.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4LCWUBV]. In this latter example, it is not that self-identification is insufficient to prove
an identity claim, but rather that the person failed to self-identify. See also Final Guidance on Maintaining, Collecting, and Reporting Racial and Ethnic Data to the U.S.
Department of Education, 72 Fed. Reg. 59266, 59268 (Oct. 19, 2007) (calling for “ob-
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ever, there does not appear to be any information on how often this
identity reassignment occurs in practice or if it occurs at all.
Both the modern-day and historical exceptions to the general rule
that self-identification is sufficient for data-collection laws involve immutable identities, and race in particular. This is in line with the general pattern that immutable identities tend to be more closely
interrogated than mutable ones. But for the most part, self-identification is currently sufficient to establish an identity claim for a datacollection law for both mutable and immutable identities. This is true
regardless of why the data is being used—whether it’s used to track
discrimination, allocate resources, or for some other purpose.
However, self-identification may not always be the best type of
identity evidence, depending on why the data is being collected. For
instance, if the identity data is being collected to track patterns of discrimination, asking someone how they racially self-identify may not
actually track patterns of racial discrimination. This is because there
are many instances where someone’s racial self-identification does not
align with the race are assigned by someone who discriminates against
them. Said differently, if a multiracial or racially ambiguous individual
self-identifies as “white” on a data-collection form but is perceived as
Black and discriminated against on that basis, the data will not reflect
this instance of discrimination since the racial identity data does not
track the basis upon which they were discriminated. The same logic
applies for other identities, not just race. A gay person who is not out
to their employer or community may self-identify as gay on the datacollection form. But if no one knows they are gay, they are unlikely to
be discriminated against on that basis. Thus, depending on why the
data is being collected, identity adjudication may need to take other
forms of identity evidence into account, beyond just selfidentification.63

server identification” of the race and ethnicity of elementary and secondary school
students when neither the student nor the parent has elected a racial/ethnic identity).
63. Some legal scholars have made a similar point about data collection, self-identification, and measuring discrimination, noting that racial discrimination and hierarchies are more often produced by the racialized individual’s involuntary ascription to
a racial group rather than that person’s self-identification. See, e,g., FORD, supra note
33, at 8 (describing “physical appearance as the primary marker of racial difference”);
Naomi Mezey, Erasure and Recognition: The Census, Race and the National Imagination, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 1701, 1753 (2003) (arguing that in the context of Census datacollection efforts, racial self-identification makes it more difficult to accurately measure racial discrimination); Lauren Sudeall, Undoing Race? Reconciling Multiracial
Identity with Equal Protection, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1243, 1291–92 (2014) (arguing that
internal understandings of identity are not effective when the purpose of a data-collection law to is address racial hierarchies, which are based on ascribed racial
identity).
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B. Anti-Discrimination Laws
On the whole, identity is adjudicated more intensely in anti-discrimination law as compared to data-collection laws. Some courts focus on
discovering a plaintiff’s “actual” identity and require more than just
self-identification to prove an identity claim. This search for a plaintiff’s “true” identity tends to manifest in two ways. First, some judges
attempt to adjudicate the plaintiff’s identity for themselves based on
whatever the judge deems “objective” evidence of a particular identity. For instance, a judge may determine a plaintiff’s racial identity
based on her skin color, accent, and facial features. Second, judges
sometimes impose on plaintiffs what legal scholar D. Wendy Greene
calls an “actuality requirement.”64 The actuality requirement mandates alignment between the plaintiff’s self-identification and the
identity their discriminator perceived them to be.65 For instance, if a
Black man’s employer misperceived him as Hispanic and subjected
him to harassment based on that misperception, he would not be able
to bring a claim if a court imposed an actuality requirement. These are
also often called “misperception” cases.
On the other hand, some courts do not interrogate the plaintiff’s
“actual” identity at all. The relevant inquiry for these courts is not the
plaintiff’s identity per se; rather, they ask whether the alleged discrimination was based on race, sex, religion, or sexual orientation. For example, courts in this category do not care whether a plaintiff who
alleges sexual orientation discrimination is gay or not; what matters is
whether they were mistreated because of sexual orientation, whether
actual, perceived, or otherwise.
Whether a court is likely to adjudicate a plaintiff’s identity, or look
to the employer’s perception of the plaintiff’s identity, appears to be
highly dependent on the identity involved. Courts addressing claims
that involve more immutable identities (race and sex) are more likely
to adjudicate the “actual” identity of the plaintiff, and cases involving
more mutable identities (sexual orientation and religion) generally do
not.66
1. Sexual Orientation
Courts addressing sexual orientation discrimination claims generally do not closely interrogate the plaintiff’s identity, if they do at all.
The relevant question in these cases is not what the plaintiff’s sexual
orientation actually is, but instead, whether the discrimination was
based on sexual orientation. This means that straight plaintiffs who
are misperceived as gay can typically bring claims even though their
64. Greene, supra note 17, at 90–91.
65. Id.
66. This Subsection focuses primarily on the adjudication of identity in disparate
treatment cases versus disparate impact cases.
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sexual orientation does not align with the sexuality upon which they
are basing their discrimination claim. Indeed, many states’ anti-discrimination statutes protect actual or perceived sexual orientation,67
meaning that plaintiffs whose sexuality is misperceived can bring
claims. For example, in a suit brought under a statute that protects
both actual and perceived sexual orientation, the plaintiff—who identified as heterosexual and was married to a woman—alleged that he
was subjected to anti-gay bullying because his coworkers thought he
was gay.68 The plaintiff’s heterosexuality was irrelevant to the ultimate
adjudication of his claim, and after a trial, a jury awarded him millions
in damages.69
Statutes like these, however, do not apply to all instances of antigay discrimination. When straight plaintiffs bring claims based on
homophobic bullying, they lose when their harassers know that they
are straight. For example, one court dismissed a plaintiff’s harassment
claim because his coworkers testified that they did not think he was
gay, even though they teased him for liking “gay boy music” and referred to him as a “dick smoker.”70 Thus, when state law protects both
actual and perceived sexual orientation, the plaintiff’s identity is not
relevant in the sense that a plaintiff of any sexual orientation can
bring a discrimination claim based on anti-gay bias. The plaintiff’s
identity only becomes relevant when it informs the discriminator’s
perception or knowledge of the plaintiff’s sexual orientation. When
the discriminator becomes aware of the plaintiff’s sexual orientation,
the plaintiff can only bring a claim based on that specific sexuality.
Federal law mirrors state law on this question. Sexual orientation
was not protected under Title VII in some jurisdictions until the Supreme Court’s Bostock v. Clayton County decision,71 but the jurisdic67. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926(o) (West 2021) (“[S]exual orientation . . .
includes a perception that the person has . . . [that] characteristic[ ] . . . .”).
68. Pearl v. City of Los Angeles, 248 Cal. Rptr. 3d 508, 511–12 (Ct. App. 2019).
69. See id. at 510; see also Matt Hamilton, L.A. Sanitation Worker Taunted Over
Perceived Homosexuality Wins $17.4-Million Verdict, L.A. TIMES (June 15, 2017, 9:30
PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-city-discrimination-verdict20170615-story.html [https://perma.cc/P967-KZJK] (noting that a heterosexual L.A.
sanitation worker was awarded $17.4 million after he endured repeated harassment
by his supervisors who perceived him as gay); 1212 Rest. Grp., LLC v. Alexander, 959
N.E.2d 155, 158 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (upholding the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff’s harassers perceived the plaintiff to be gay based on their anti-gay insults and
their statements to coworkers that they thought the plaintiff was gay).
70. Glinski v. Radioshack, No. 03-CV-93OS, 2006 WL 2827870, at *12 (W.D.N.Y.
Sept. 29, 2006). In a similar case, the plaintiff’s coworkers “called him names such as
‘gay,’ ‘homosexual,’ ‘sissy,’ and ‘woman’ ” and subjected him to “unwanted touching,
sexual jokes and comments.” The court held that the plaintiff was not protected under
California’s anti-discrimination statute because his “coworkers knew he had been
married and had a child” and testified “that they did not perceive him to be gay.”
Akoidu v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. B147046, 2002 WL 399476, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 15, 2002).
71. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737–38 (2020).
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tions that did include sexual orientation under Title VII’s protections
pre-Bostock allowed misperception claims. In a Southern District of
New York case, for instance, the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s
claims failed because he didn’t allege that he was “not heterosexual,”
but the court rejected this argument and reasoned that heterosexual
plaintiffs can bring claims based on their misperceived sexual orientation.72 Other courts have followed suit.73 Whether this same principle
will be applied in other jurisdictions post-Bostock is not certain at this
point, but as of right now, there is little reason to think other courts
would apply a different principle in adjudicating sexual orientation.
2. Religion
Like sexual orientation, religious identity claims are also not closely
scrutinized in discrimination cases. Courts generally take plaintiffs at
their word that they are members of particular religions or that their
religious beliefs require them to do something. Moreover, plaintiffs
can usually sustain religious misperception claims, and one recent Supreme Court case suggests any inquiry into individuals’ actual religious beliefs is not necessary.74 However, some courts do reject
misperception cases, though these appear to be in the minority.
Cases in which a plaintiff’s self-identification is sufficient to prove
their religious identity abound. In one paradigmatic case out of the
Fifth Circuit, Davis v. Fort Bend County, the plaintiff was fired for
attending a religious service rather than reporting to her job, so she
brought suit alleging religious discrimination.75 The court held that the
plaintiff sincerely believed her attendance was compelled by her
faith.76 To support its holding, the court relied exclusively on the
plaintiff’s own testimony and did not require any additional evidence—such as testimony from church leaders or other congregation
members—to prove her religious identity.77
72. Sanderson v. Leg Apparel LLC, No. 1:19-cv-08423, 2020 WL 3100256, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2020).
73. See Johnson v. City of New York, No. 18-CV-9600, 2020 WL 2036708, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020) (holding that allegations of mistreatment based on perceived
sexual orientation sufficient to state a claim under Title VII); see also Jamiel v. Maison
Kayser@USA.com, No. 1:19-cv-01389, 2019 WL 9362541, at *4 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19,
2019) (same).
74. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 773 (2015).
75. Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty., 765 F.3d 480, 483–84 (5th Cir. 2014).
76. Id. at 487.
77. Id. Under similar circumstances, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s attendance at his father’s funeral was required under his sincerely held religious
beliefs based only on the plaintiff’s testimony. See Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners,
LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 452 (7th Cir. 2013) (looking to plaintiff’s deposition and declarations). Other courts have followed suit. E.g., Fox v. Hoenigsberg & Duevel Corp., No.
1:18-CV-265, 2019 WL 10960442, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 8, 2019) (relying solely on
the plaintiff’s testimony to determine that her religious belief was sincere); EEOC v.
Consol. Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d 131, 142–143 (4th Cir. 2017) (same); Baker v. Home
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Davis and similar cases only require self-identification, but a 2015
Supreme Court case suggests that any inquiry into the plaintiff’s religious beliefs, including self-identification, may not be necessary. In this
case, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Abercrombie & Fitch refused to
hire Samantha Elauf because the headscarf she wore violated Abercrombie’s dress code.78 Although Elauf had not disclosed her religion
to Abercrombie, Abercrombie believed that she wore the headscarf in
connection with her Muslim faith.79 When Elauf sued, Abercrombie
argued that she could not show disparate treatment because she had
never disclosed her religion to Abercrombie or explained that she
wore the headscarf for religious reasons.80 The Court rejected this argument and held that the employer need not have actual knowledge
of someone’s religion to violate Title VII.81 Rather, an “employer who
acts with the motive of avoiding accommodation may violate Title VII
even if he has no more than an unsubstantiated suspicion that accommodation would be needed.”82 Elauf did identify as Muslim, but the
Court’s reasoning applies regardless of her actual religious identity.83
The employer used ascriptive evidence (her headscarf) to assign a particular religious identity to Elauf and then discriminated against her
based on that ascription.84 Elauf’s “actual” religious identity was irrelevant to the Court.85 Like the sexual orientation cases, it was the employer’s perception that mattered.
Relatedly, courts are also generally willing to accept misperception
claims, focusing not on whether the plaintiff is in fact a member of a
particular religion but whether she was treated worse because of religion. In Smith v. Specialty Pool Contractors, for instance, the court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment when a Catholic
plaintiff claimed that his employer thought he was Jewish and discriminated against him on that basis.86
Depot, 445 F.3d 541, 547 (2d Cir. 2006) (same); Jiglov v. Hotel Peabody, G.P., 719 F.
Supp. 2d 918, 927 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (same).
78. Abercrombie, 575 U.S. at 770.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 772.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 773 (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id.; see also Cole v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 1:17-cv-01378, 2017 WL
9477374, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 6, 2017) (applying Abercrombie to religious misperception claim and holding that Title VII applies when an “employer’s adverse decision is
based on ‘unsubstantiated suspicion,’ ” even when that unsubstantiated suspicion is
incorrect (citation omitted)).
86. Smith v. Specialty Pool Contractors, No. 02:07cv1464, 2008 WL 4410163, at
*5–6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2008). In a related context, the Third Circuit approved of
religious misperception claims, stating that an “employer is still discriminating on the
basis of religion even if the applicant he refuses to hire is not in fact a Muslim.”
Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 571 (3d Cir. 2002). What matters, the
court explained, “is that the applicant, whether Muslim or not, was treated worse than
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However, some courts do not follow this pattern and have rejected
misperception religious discrimination claims. For example, one federal district court dismissed the plaintiff’s discrimination claim in part
because his allegations were not based on his actual religion (Universalist) but rather on the misperception that he was Muslim.87 The
court reasoned that “Congress has not enacted laws that would make
adverse employment actions based on someone being perceived as
having a religious affiliation, be it Catholic, Muslim, or any other religion, actionable under Title VII.”88
3. Race
Many courts exact a more demanding burden on plaintiffs’ racial
identity claims than with sexual orientation or religion. First, unlike
religion or sexual orientation, some courts attempt to determine for
themselves the plaintiff’s racial identity based on what they call “objective” indicators. These indicators are predominantly ascriptive factors, specifically appearance and identity performance. For instance,
in Bennun v. Rutgers State University, the court determined that the
plaintiff was Hispanic based on its own observations of the plaintiff’s
appearance, his speech and mannerisms, his “immersion in Spanish
ways of life,” and “that he speaks Spanish in the home.”89 In other
words, the court adjudicated the plaintiff’s identity to be Hispanic not
because he said he was (which he did) but based on how he looked,
spoke, and lived.90 As additional support for its finding, the court relied on ancestral evidence, citing the fact that the plaintiff was born in
Argentina and that his father traced his ancestry to Spain.91 Although
the court recognized that discrimination is generally triggered by how
the alleged discriminator perceives the plaintiff, it did not determine
the plaintiff’s race using the discriminator’s perception; instead, the
court relied on its own assessment of the plaintiff’s race.92
he otherwise would have been for reasons prohibited by the statute.” Id.; see also
Kallabat v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., No. 12-CV-15470, 2015 WL 5358093, at *4 (E.D. Mich.
June 18, 2015) (allowing claim to proceed based on coworkers’ perception that plaintiff was Muslim).
87. El v. Max Daetwyler Corp., No. 3:09cv415, 2011 WL 1769805, at *6 (W.D.N.C.
May 9, 2011), aff’d, 451 F. App’x 257 (4th Cir. 2011).
88. Id.; see also Le v. N.Y. State, Off. of State Comptroller, No. 1:16-CV-1517,
2017 WL 3084414, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017) (rejecting misperception claim);
Lewis v. N. Gen. Hosp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 390, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (rejecting misperception claim but stating that misperception was not dispositive). The Max
Daetwyler court also held that plaintiff’s claim failed because he did not establish that
his coworkers thought he was Muslim. Max Daetwyler, 2011 WL 1769805, at *6–7.
89. Bennun v. Rutgers, 941 F.2d 154, 173 (3d Cir. 1991).
90. Id. at 172–73.
91. Id.
92. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-2\TWL206.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 23

ADJUDICATING IDENTITY

10-MAR-22

14:18

289

Similarly, in Perkins v. Lake County Department of Utilities,93 the
court determined whether the plaintiff was Native American94 based
on its own assessment of the plaintiff’s “physical appearance [as] an
Indian” and the plaintiff’s self-identification.95 The court also referenced the plaintiff’s potential Native American ancestry, noting “he
may have some Native American blood, albeit less than 1/16th.”96
However, the court also made an alternative holding that focused on
the discriminator’s perception of the plaintiff. The court reasoned that
“[s]o long as there is some objective evidence reflective of a basis” for
the plaintiff’s employer to think that he was Native American, the
court did not need to “resolve whether the employee is one percent
Native American or one hundred percent Native American.”97 This
“objective basis,” according to the court, included ascriptive evidence
such as the plaintiff’s “physical appearance, language, cultural activities, or associations” that “lead the employer to believe that a given
employee is a member of that protected class, and to deal with him/
her on that basis.”98
Although this alternative holding shifts the focus to the employer’s
perception of the plaintiff’s identity and away from the court’s assessment of the plaintiff’s identity, the employer’s perception is still subject to an “objectivity” test based on the court’s understanding of
racial characteristics.99 Like Bennun and Perkins, other courts have
used ascriptive evidence such as linguistic characteristics,100 “charac93. Perkins v. Lake Cnty. Dep’t of Utils., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1276 (N.D. Ohio
1994).
94. “Native American” status is considered a racialized identity and/or a political
category, depending on the context. See Bethany R. Berger, Race, Descent, and Tribal
Citizenship, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 23, 33, 25–26 (2013). This Article’s discussion of
anti-discrimination laws includes Native American under the umbrella of “race” because courts treat claims alleging discrimination on the basis of Native American status as race or national origin claims. See, e.g., Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1272–74
(discussing the lack of coherent distinction between race and national original discrimination claims). In different contexts, “Native American” is not treated as a racial
category. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (holding that the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ preference for hiring Native Americans was not racial discrimination because it applies to “members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes” and not a
racial group).
95. Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1276.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1278.
98. Id.
99. Id.; see also Greene v. Swain Cnty. P’ship for Health, 342 F. Supp. 2d 442, 451
(W.D.N.C. 2004) (following Perkins and holding that the plaintiff could prove “she
was a member of a protected class” by showing her employer “had a basis to reasonably believe” that she was Native American (emphasis added)).
100. See Harel v. Rutgers, State Univ., 5 F. Supp. 2d 246, 269 (D.N.J. 1998)
(“Harel’s objective appearance likely might lead the reasonable employer to deduce
that he was Israeli: he was raised in Israel; he speaks Hebrew, his first language, at
home; he speaks English with a discernible accent; he remains an Israeli citizen; and
he clearly identifies with his Israeli culture.”).
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teristics common to Jamaican[-]born persons,”101 and skin color102 to
adjudicate plaintiffs’ racial identities.103 And in one case involving
anti-Native American discrimination, the court required ancestral evidence to prove Native American identity.104
At least one court has rejected a plaintiff’s race discrimination
claims because he did not meet the court’s “objective” indicators of
racial identity. In Nieves v. Metropolitan Dade County, the court questioned the plaintiff’s Hispanic self-identification based on the court’s
own observations about the plaintiff, stating that “neither from observing the Plaintiff nor from listening to his speech patterns, mannerisms and pronunciation of the English language was it apparent that
Plaintiff was Hispanic.”105 Because these ascriptive indicators of the
plaintiff’s racial background did not align with what the court thought
Hispanic people looked or sounded like, the plaintiff’s identity was
not adjudicated to be Hispanic, and his claim failed.106
These so-called “objective” indicators of racial identity are generally pulled from thin air. Courts are typically not relying on any legal
authority, much less anything in Title VII itself, to justify their reliance
on these forms of identity evidence. Nor do they explain why these
indicators are “objective” as opposed to the judge’s own subjective
thoughts about the constitutive elements of a particular racial identity.
In addition to this “objective” indicators of race inquiry, the second
way courts’ increased scrutiny on racial identity claims manifests is in
the more frequent rejection of misperception claims as compared with
other identity claims. For example, in Lopez–Galvan v. Mens
Wearhouse, the plaintiff identified as Latino and brought a discrimination claim on the ground that his employer misperceived him to be
Black and mistreated him based on that misperception.107 The court
101. Holness v. Penn State Univ., No. 98–2484, 1999 WL 270388, at *6 (E.D. Pa.
May 5, 1999).
102. See, e.g., id.
103. See also Perry v. Autozoners, LLC, 948 F. Supp. 2d 778, 787 (W.D. Ky. 2013)
(finding that mixed-race individuals belong to a protected class as long as they “visually appear[ ]” to belong in that class).
104. Leonard v. Katsinas, No. 05-1069, 2007 WL 1106136, at *13 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 11,
2007). On summary judgment, the court rejected the defendants’ invitation to impose
an actuality requirement on the plaintiffs and held the discriminator’s belief that the
plaintiffs were Native American was sufficient. Id. However, the court also explained
that at trial, the plaintiffs would need to provide proof of their Native American ancestry. Id. Based on the court’s descriptions of the plaintiffs, many of them would not
be able to meet this standard. Id. at *2. All the plaintiffs self-identified as Native
American, but only one of the plaintiffs was, according to the court, a “card-carrying”
Native American because he was able to produce his father’s tribal enrollment card.
Id.
105. Nieves v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 598 F. Supp. 955, 961 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Lopez–Galvan v. Mens Wearhouse, No. 3:06cv537, 2008 WL 2705604,
at *7–8 (W.D.N.C. July 10, 2008) (the exact allegation was that he was misperceived
as “Negroid”).
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held that his claim was not viable because Title VII does not explicitly
include people who are perceived to be a particular race.108 So, because the plaintiff was not Black, he could not bring a claim.109 Numerous other courts have come to the same conclusion regarding
misperception claims in the context of race.110
At least one court has required the discriminatory conduct itself—
in addition to the discriminator’s perception—to align with the plaintiff’s self-identification.111 Said differently, the plaintiff’s self-identification, ascribed identity, and the racial identity that is the target of the
harassment must align. In this case, Burrage v. FedEx Freight, Inc., the
plaintiff’s co-workers initially misperceived him as Mexican and
harassed him on that basis.112 Once he clarified that he self-identified
as biracial (half Black and half white), his co-workers still harassed
him using derogatory comments about Mexicans.113 The court dismissed Burrage’s claim and reasoned that he did not “maintain that
his supervisors and co-workers began to use any terms that
were . . . related to his status as an African-American, upon learning
of his true race.”114 Under the court’s reasoning, Burrage could only
sustain a claim if he were in fact Mexican or if the derogatory comments were about biracial or Black people.115
To be sure, many other cases do not impose this requirement on
plaintiffs and have openly critiqued the rationale behind the actuality
requirement.116 According to one district court, the actuality requirement “is as offensive as it is incorrect.”117 For these courts, the plaintiff’s identity is of little importance, and these courts focus on how the
108. Id.
109. Id. at *9.
110. See, e.g., Sears v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., No. 3:12-1322, 2014 WL 1665048, at *7–8
(M.D. Tenn. Apr. 25, 2014) (rejecting discrimination-based misperception that the
plaintiff was Black); Yousif v. Landers McClarty Olathe KS, LLC, No. 12-2788, 2013
WL 5819703, at *5 (D. Kan. Oct. 29, 2013); Guthrey v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab.,
No. 1:10-cv-02177, 2012 WL 2499938, at *15 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2012); Adler v. Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 07 C 4203, 2008 WL 5272455, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
16, 2008); Uddin v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., No. 1:05-CV-1115, 2006 WL
1835291, at *6 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2006); Butler v. Potter, 345 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850
(E.D. Tenn. 2004).
111. Burrage v. FedEx Freight, Inc., No. 4:10CV2755, 2012 WL 1068794, at *8
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012).
112. Id. at *1.
113. Id.
114. Id. at *8 n.8.
115. Greene, supra note 17, at 110 (making a similar observation about Burrage).
116. See EEOC v. MVM, Inc., No. TDC-17-2864, 2018 WL 2197727, at *10 (D. Md.
May 14, 2018) (“Discrimination where the employer is mistaken in his belief that an
employee is of a particular national origin is just as insidious as discrimination where
the employer is correct.”); Arsham v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 85 F. Supp. 3d
841, 845 (D. Md. 2015); Henao v. Wyndham Vacations Resorts, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 2d
978, 987 (D. Haw. 2013).
117. Boutros v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., LLC, No. 10 C 8196, 2013 WL 3834405, at *7
(N.D. Ill. July 24, 2013).
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discriminator perceived the plaintiff’s identity. For instance, in Wood
v. Freeman Decorating Services, Inc., the employer’s perception of the
plaintiff’s Native American identity was sufficient even though the
plaintiff had no documentary evidence that he was Native American.118 Rather, both the plaintiff’s birth certificate and his prior employment records identified him as white/Hispanic.119 However, his
employer thought he was Native American, the slurs directed at him
were about Native Americans,120 and Wood stated that he self-identified as Native American.121
In summary, courts interrogate race (an immutable identity) more
closely than religion and sexual orientation (more mutable identities),
which manifests in two ways: first, by determining whether the plaintiff’s claimed racial identity meets some “objective” standard adopted
by the court; and second, by rejecting misperception claims. Courts
addressing discrimination claims based on sexual orientation and religion, for the most part, did neither.
4. Sex122
Courts adjudicating sex in anti-discrimination cases also focus on
the plaintiff’s “actual” sex. For most courts, a plaintiff’s “actual” sex is
118. Wood v. Freeman Decorating Servs., Inc., No. 3:08–CV–00375, 2010 WL
653764, at *4 (D. Nev. Feb. 19, 2010).
119. Id.
120. Wood alleged that he was called things like a “fuck’n injun,” “prairie ni****,”
“injun,” and “wagon burner.” Id. at *3. He also stated that he was “forced [ ] to use a
desk that had a poster attached to it depicting a wagon on fire and with the words
‘Wagon Burner’ ” and that his co-workers “introduced him to clients as ‘one of our
wagon burners’ or ‘stupid injun.’ ” Id.
121. Id. at *5 (“The alleged discrimination is ‘no less malevolent because it may
have been based on an erroneous assumption.’ ” (alterations incorporated)); see also
Estate of Amos ex rel. Amos v. City of Page, 257 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 2001)
(mistaken belief that individual was Native American was sufficient to maintain equal
protection claim); Eriksen v. Allied Waste Sys., Inc., No. 06-13549, 2007 WL 1003851,
at *6 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 2, 2007) (same). For these courts, perceived race can be powerful enough to rebut other identity evidence, such as self-identification and ancestral
evidence. Chaib v. GEO Group, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 3d 829, 837 (S.D. Ind. 2015) (dismissing claim brought by a plaintiff who self-identified as African American and was
of Algerian descent because she was not perceived as African American by her employer or co-workers), aff’d, 819 F.3d 337 (7th Cir. 2016).
122. This Article does not differentiate between “sex” and “gender.” Recognizing
that the definitions of these two terms have sparked much debate, this Article does
not engage with that debate. Formulating universal definitions of sex and gender for
this Article is at odds with one of its primary arguments—namely, that the definitions
of identity are highly dependent on context. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:
FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 1–34 (Linda A. Nicholson ed., 1990)
[hereinafter GENDER TROUBLE]; JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE
DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF “SEX” 8–12 (1993) [hereinafter BODIES THAT MATTER]; see
also Clarke, supra note 28, at 933–34 (resisting universal definitions for sex and
gender for similar reasons and explaining that “[a]ttempts to settle metaphysical
debates about what sex and gender are distract from the question of how these
concepts should be defined in particular legal contexts, if at all”). What is typically
referred to as “sex” (chromosomes, hormones, secondary sex characteristics) this
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based on biological evidence, including their sex assigned at birth,
chromosomes, sex characteristics, or hormones. Documentary evidence (like birth certificates), ascriptive sex, and self-identification are
also relevant in certain cases, but biological evidence is of primary
importance.
Most sex discrimination cases involve cisgender plaintiffs, and in
these cases, the plaintiff’s sex is not explicitly adjudicated. Typically, a
cisgender plaintiff’s sex is not questioned by the court or the parties
because they assume they know the “true” sex identity of the plaintiff.
That is, if the plaintiff says she is a woman, she ascriptively appears to
be a woman, and there is no evidence to think otherwise, the parties
and the court will assume that she has other traits associated with womanhood (XX chromosomes, a uterus, etc.).123 However, as explained
further below, even though her sex was not explicitly adjudicated, her
claims still depend on her “actual” sex. Thus, although sex adjudication is most visible when it comes to transgender plaintiffs, the same
focus on “actual” biological sex applies to cis and trans plaintiffs.
Until fairly recently, discrimination on the basis of transgender
identity was not covered under anti-discrimination laws’ prohibition
against sex discrimination. Now, and particularly after Bostock v.
Clayton County, the opposite is true. Yet courts have adjudicated sex
in similar ways regardless of whether discrimination against transgender plaintiffs is covered. Specifically, sex adjudication has depended on biological evidence. In older cases, courts denied
transgender plaintiffs’ claims because biological evidence of their sex
did not align with their self-identification or their ascriptive sex.124 In
more recent cases, courts still rely on biological evidence but generally
allow transgender plaintiffs to bring claims under anti-discrimination
statutes.125
Older cases interpreted anti-discrimination statutes’ prohibition of
sex discrimination as prohibiting discrimination against “women because they are women and against men because they are men.”126
These courts understood Title VII and related statutes to apply when
people who were assigned female at birth are discriminated against
because of their identification as a woman and/or their performance
of their womanhood. A trans woman, under this reasoning, is born
male but is discriminated against based on her identification as a woArticle calls biological evidence of sex. And the common understanding of “gender”
(masculinity, femininity) is encompassed in what this Article calls ascriptive evidence
of sex.
123. Genitals ascribed to someone based on more visible sex cues (appearance,
mannerisms, etc.) have been referred to as “cultural genitals.” See SUZANNE J. KESSLER & WENDY MCKENNA, GENDER: AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 153
(Univ. of Chi. Press ed., 1978).
124. See, e.g. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
125. See generally Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
126. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085.
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man (or as a transgender woman) and performance of her womanhood; accordingly, Title VII did not apply because the discrimination
is against a biological man because she is a “woman”—not against a
“man” because he is a “man.”
One of the most oft-cited cases following this line of reasoning is a
1984 case from the Seventh Circuit, Ulane v. East Airlines. This case
involved a plaintiff who transitioned from male to female on the job
and was subsequently terminated.127 The court recognized that the
plaintiff self-identified as a woman and ascriptively appeared to be a
woman, noting that Ulane took hormones, developed breasts, had sex
reassignment surgery, and changed the sex marker on her birth certificate.128 Yet, the court still found that Ulane was a “biological male”
because she did not “have a uterus and ovaries,” could not “bear babies,” and still had XY chromosomes.129 According to the court,
Ulane was someone with a “male body who believes himself to be
female.”130 Because Ulane was a “biological man” who failed to allege
discrimination based on her “manhood,” she could not bring a claim
on this basis under Title VII.131 In other words, the biological evidence of her sex did not match the ascriptive evidence of her sex or
her self-identification.
The Tenth Circuit echoed this reasoning over 20 years later in Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority.132 The court relied on Ulane’s holding
that Title VII’s “prohibition on sex discrimination means only that it is
‘unlawful to discriminate against women because they are women and
men because they are men.’”133 Thus, according to the court, Title VII
did not recognize a claim based on a plaintiff’s “status as a transsexual.”134 It explained that Title VII “extends to transsexual employees
only if they are discriminated against because they are male or because they are female.”135 Because the plaintiff was alleging discrimination based on the incongruity between her sex assigned at birth
(male) and her chosen sex (female or “transsexual”), she could not
state a claim.136
More recent cases allow transgender plaintiffs to get relief under
Title VII, but courts’ adjudication of sex still mostly relies on plain127. Id. at 1082.
128. Id. at 1083.
129. Id. at 1083, 1087.
130. Id. at 1085.
131. Id. at 1087.
132. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
133. Id. at 1221 (quoting Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085).
134. Id. at 1221.
135. Id. at 1222; see also Oiler v. Winn–Dixie La., Inc., No. 00-3114, 2002 WL
31098541, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002) (holding that Title VII does not recognize
claims by “a person born with a male body who believes himself to be a female, or a
person born with a female body who believes herself to be male” (quoting Ulane, 742
F.2d at 1085)).
136. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1221.
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tiffs’ biological traits, and these biological traits still determine the
plaintiff’s “actual” sex. The only difference is that rather than requiring plaintiffs’ biological traits to align with their ascriptive sex and
self-identification, it is the mismatch between these types of identity
evidence that allows them to state a claim.
This line of cases relies on a sex-stereotyping theory of sex discrimination—that requiring conformity between biological sex and ascriptive sex/self-identification constitutes sex discrimination. Sexstereotyping finds its origins in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a case
about a cisgender woman’s gender nonconformity.137 In Price
Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins, a senior manager at a top accounting firm,
sued under Title VII, alleging that she had been denied a promotion
to partner because her “aggressive” demeanor did not align with the
partners’ understanding of femininity.138 The Supreme Court held that
discrimination based on sex included discrimination based on a failure
to conform to sex stereotypes—i.e., an employer cannot fire a cisgender woman because she fails to perform her femininity in accordance with societal expectations of womanhood.139
Using this analytical framework, courts have extended the Price
Waterhouse rationale to include discrimination claims from transgender plaintiffs, reasoning that the discrimination stemmed from a
mismatch between the plaintiff’s “actual” sex (based on biological
traits) and the plaintiff’s sex presentation and performance (i.e., their
ascriptive sex). Two examples follow.
First, in Smith v. City of Salem, the Sixth Circuit held that a transgender plaintiff could bring a discrimination claim under Title VII,140
reasoning that if “an employer who discriminates against women because, for instance, they do not wear dresses or makeup, is engaging in
sex discrimination,” then so are “employers who discriminate against
men because they do wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act femininely.”141 Thus, the court adjudicated the plaintiff’s “actual” sex to
be “male” because she was assigned male at birth.142 Because her “actual” sex did not align with her ascriptive sex, the court applied Price
Waterhouse.143
137. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 233–36 (1989).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 252; see also Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d
107, 113 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that employer could not fire an employee based on
the stereotype that mothers cannot devote sufficient time to their jobs).
140. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568, 572 (6th Cir. 2004).
141. Id. at 574; see also Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011)
(applying the mismatch theory to an equal protection claim brought by a transgender
plaintiff and stating that “[t]he very acts that define transgender people as transgender are those that contradict stereotypes of gender-appropriate appearance and
behavior”).
142. Smith, 378 F.3d 566.
143. Id. at 574–75.
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About 15 years later, the Sixth Circuit again held that an employer
who discriminated against a transgender woman violated Title VII because the discrimination stemmed from a mismatch between the plaintiff’s biological traits and her self-identification/ascriptive sex.144 And
again, the court’s holding was based on a determination that the plaintiff’s “actual” sex was “male” and biologically based.145 Specially, the
court reasoned that “discrimination on the basis of transgender status
necessarily entails discrimination on the basis of sex” because “an employer cannot discriminate against an employee for being transgender
without considering that employee’s biological sex.”146
These cases suggest that transgender plaintiffs’ “real” sex is the one
they were assigned at birth and ascriptive evidence of their sex merely
does not align with that sex. Because these courts fit these cases into
the Price Waterhouse rationale, they treat transgender plaintiffs as
simply more “gender nonconforming” than the cisgender plaintiff in
Price Waterhouse—a difference in degree rather than in type.147
The recent Supreme Court decision Bostock v. Clayton County—
which held that Title VII’s prohibition on the basis of sex includes
“transgender status”—does not rely on Price Waterhouse or sex-stereotyping theory specifically. Yet the Court’s rationale still rests on
identifying biological evidence of sex, and specifically a plaintiff’s sex
assigned at birth. First, the Court adopts a definition of “sex” that
refers “only to biological distinctions between male and female.”148
Then, it reasons that to discriminate against someone for being transgender, the discriminator must take the “sex” of the individual into
account.149 The Court explained that if an employer fires someone
“who was identified as a male at birth but who now identifies as a
female” but “retains an otherwise identical employee who was identi144. EEOC v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 574–75 (6th
Cir. 2018).
145. Id. at 578 (reasoning that “discrimination on the basis of transgender status
necessarily entails discrimination on the basis of sex—no matter what sex the employee was born or wishes to be”). Schoenbaum calls this shift to “the view that transgender persons are ‘inherently’ gender non-conforming, and thus that being
transgender is, by definition, gender nonconformity to sex” the “per se” approach.
Naomi Schoenbaum, The New Law of Gender Nonconformity, 105 MINN. L. REV.
831, 854 (2020).
146. Harris, 884 F.3d at 578 (emphasis added).
147. As other commentators have pointed out, this reasoning “effectively erases
transgenderism as an identity,” because “in order to avail herself of the gender-stereotyping theory[,] [the transgender woman] had to take on a male identity, namely, as
a man who wanted to participate in the workplace dressing and looking like a woman.” Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination, 63 DUKE L.J. 891, 916 (2014)
(emphasis added); see also ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND PERSONHOOD 86 (2008) (“Transsexuals or transgender people per se do
not really exist in the Smith opinion; there just happen to be some men out there who
want to wear dresses.”).
148. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020).
149. Id. at 1741.
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fied as female at birth, the employer intentionally penalizes a person
identified as male at birth for traits or actions that it tolerates in an
employee identified as female at birth.”150 Thus, Bostock still relies on
biological traits to determine the “actual” sex of a plaintiff.151
Although this Subsection has focused on transgender plaintiffs, this
same focus on biological evidence of sex applies to cisgender plaintiffs—the difference is that the plaintiff’s “actual” sex is not contested.
Said differently, a cisgender plaintiff’s biological traits still dictate her
“sex,” but the composition of those biological traits is assumed. Ann
Hopkins did not have to prove that she had a vagina, a uterus, and XX
chromosomes because she was presumed to have them. But those biological traits were still constitutive of her “actual” sex and formed the
basis of the Court’s sex-stereotyping holding.152
Legal scholar Naomi Schoenbaum’s analysis of Price Waterhouse
elucidates the role “actual,” biological-based sex plays in sex stereotyping cases involving cisgender people. She argues that courts employ a three-step analysis when applying the Price Waterhouse sexstereotyping doctrine.153 The very first step is determining the plaintiff’s “actual” sex (i.e., Ann Hopkins is a woman).154 Then, courts
evaluate how the employer perceived the plaintiff’s gender (i.e., “the
employer viewed Hopkins as ‘masculine’”).155 Last, courts “compar[e]
the expected gender performance based on the plaintiff’s sex with her
perceived gender performance: [I]f the employer acted because these
do not ‘match,’ the employer has engaged in unlawful sex stereotyping.”156 Adjudicating the plaintiff’s “actual” sex, therefore, is foundational to courts’ analyses.
Sex is the identity most rigorously scrutinized in anti-discrimination
law for two reasons. First, “actual” sex appears to be key to most discrimination cases. For racial identity, only some courts adjudicate the
“actual” identity of the plaintiff, and very few do so in the context of
sexual orientation and religion. Second, courts rely more heavily on
biological evidence in sex adjudication than any other identity, and
biological evidence of sex is either impossible to change (like chromosomes) or difficult to change (like having surgery to change sex characteristics). No other identity category analyzed in this Article is
adjudicated with as heavy of a reliance on biological evidence as sex.
150. Id.
151. Not all courts define sex according to sex assigned at birth, or other biological
traits, like Bostock. See, e.g., Harris, 884 F.3d at 578; Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn.,
172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 526 (D. Conn. 2016) (rejecting a biologically based, binary definition of sex).
152. See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
153. Schoenbaum, supra note 145, at 842.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 842–43.
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*************************
This cross-identity examination of identity adjudication in anti-discrimination law has revealed a large degree of inconsistency. For instance, some courts accept racial misperception claims while others
don’t; courts are more likely to reject racial misperception claims as
compared with sexual orientation and religious misperception claims;
a plaintiff’s “actual” race and sex are more likely to matter than a
plaintiff’s “actual” sexual orientation or religion. Additionally, legal
actors sometimes adjudicate plaintiffs’ racial identity claims themselves based on “objective” standards. Yet with sexual orientation and
religion, courts do not require plaintiffs’ identity claims to meet some
supposedly “objective” criteria. They do not, for instance, require
plaintiffs bringing a sexual orientation discrimination claim to be in a
same-sex relationship, be a member of an LGBT organization, “look”
gay, or even self-identify as gay. For religious identity, requiring someone’s religious beliefs to meet some “objective” standard would likely
violate the First Amendment.157
But there are no doctrinal justifications for why courts are adjudicating these identity claims differently. The applicable anti-discrimination statutes and case law instruct courts to apply the same analytical
framework regardless of the specific type of discrimination alleged.
Moreover, courts themselves are not explaining why certain identity
claims receive different treatment—indeed, they may not even be
aware of this differential treatment. Thus, not only is there inconsistent identity adjudication in anti-discrimination law, this inconsistency
is not made visible or explained.
C. Benefit Laws
Generally speaking, benefit laws involve forward-facing state action
and may involve individuals asking a state actor to affirmatively do
something on their behalf—like deem them eligible for something,
grant them a certain status, or classify them in a particular way. Some
examples include: qualifying for government contracting programs
targeting businesses owned by racial minorities; meeting legal requirements to have the state change sex markers on government documents; and being eligible for immigration relief based on a fear of
identity-based persecution. To be sure, this definition is fairly broad.
But to conduct a coherent cross-identity analysis of identity adjudication, the definition of “benefit” law needs to be broad. Unlike antidiscrimination laws, which apply to all of the identity categories discussed in this Article, identity adjudication in other legal contexts is
not as doctrinally confined.
157. See infra note 185 and accompanying discussion of the religious question
doctrine.
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In spite of the relative capaciousness of this category, identity adjudication tends to operate somewhat similarly within this category.
Specifically, benefit laws tend to adjudicate identity more intensely
across identity categories than anti-discrimination laws and data-collection laws. Self-identification alone is insufficient across the board to
prove identity, and various combinations of ancestral, biological, documentary, and/or ascriptive evidence of identity are necessary, depending on the identity.
This increased identity interrogation for benefit laws is exhibited
not only through the amount of identity evidence required but also, at
times, through “identity estoppel.”158 Identity estoppel occurs when
the identity an individual is currently claiming is different from one
that they have previously claimed, and this prior inconsistent selfidentification estops them from claiming their current identity. For example, if an individual previously identified as X on a form and now
make a claim as Y, identity estoppel would prevent them from claiming to be Y. Like with anti-discrimination laws, race and sex, the more
immutable identities, tend to be more closely interrogated than religion or sexual orientation, and identity estoppel is more frequent in
race and sex identity claims than with other identities.
1. Sexual Orientation
One area of law that provides a benefit based on sexual orientation
is asylum law. Individuals are eligible for asylum if they can establish
that they have either experienced past persecution or have a “wellfounded fear of persecution” based on, among other things, “membership of a particular social group,” which has been construed to include
sexual orientation.159 In other words, asylum functions to prevent people from being harmed in their home country based on sexual orientation. Petitioners first bring their asylum claims before an immigration
judge (“IJ”) and then may appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) if they lose. They are then permitted to appeal to the
United States Courts of Appeal. The Courts of Appeal may reverse
the BIA’s decision, but reversal is rare due to the deferential standard
under which the courts review these decisions.160 Thus, they often affirm IJ’s/BIA’s adjudication of sexual orientation.
In order for petitioners to prove their sexual orientation in this context, they cannot rely on mere self-identification and generally need to
158. See Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of “Race”
in Race-Conscious Law, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1231, 1258–59 (1994) (discussing this concept of identity estoppel in the context of race adjudication).
159. See In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990).
160. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (requiring the reviewing court to yield unless “any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude” that the IJ (or the Board)
erred); see also Tawuo v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining this
highly deferential standard).
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put forth some sort of documentary evidence to support their identity
claim. Ascriptive evidence is also important—courts have looked to
the petitioner’s appearance and mannerisms, the sex of their romantic
and sexual partners, and whether they are a member of an LGBT organization in their home country.
Courts’ focus on romantic and sexual relationships as proof of sexual orientation played out in Fuller v. Lynch.161 In this case, the IJ and
the BIA found that the asylum petitioner was not bisexual, as he
claimed to be.162 They decisions relied on the fact that he was married
to a woman, had fathered children with a woman, was previously convicted of sexual assault on a woman, and lacked any corroborating
evidence from his former boyfriends.163 They also pointed to inconsistencies in his testimony related to his sexual orientation,164 as well as
testimony unrelated to his claim to bisexuality.165 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the IJ’s determination that the petitioner was
not bisexual.166
As the dissenting opinion noted, IJ and the BIA ignored additional
evidence that supported Fuller’s claim that he was bisexual, including
his in-depth testimony “about his being bisexual and having had numerous sexual relationships with both men and women” and about
the repeated physical and verbal abuse he endured because of his sexuality.167 The dissent also critiqued the IJ’s reliance on inconsistencies
in Fuller’s testimony that had nothing to do with his bisexuality and
the IJ’s “refus[al] to believe the seven letters from Fuller’s children
and friends attesting to his bisexuality.”168
For these legal actors, the fact that Fuller had sexual and romantic
relationships with women trumped all this other evidence indicating
that he was bisexual. In other words, his heterosexual relationships
estopped him from making a claim to bisexuality—even though his
relationship with a woman did not contradict his claim that he was
bisexual. As the dissent noted in its critique of the IJ’s rationale, “Ap161. Fuller v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 866, 869–72 (7th Cir. 2016).
162. Id. at 871–72.
163. Id. at 869–70.
164. Inconsistencies in testimony that he was shot by an “anti-gay mob” when he
was at a party with his then boyfriend. Id. at 868, 870.
165. These inconsistences included “confus[ing] his sisters’ names, mix[ing] up a
sister with his mother, and g[iving] different figures for the number of sisters that he
had.” Id. at 869.
166. Id. at 871.
167. Id. at 872 (Posner, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
He testified that in college he was stoned by other students on several occasions and a few years later taunted as gay by a group of men who sliced his
face with a knife. On another occasion he was robbed at gunpoint by a man
who called him a “batty man,” which is a Jamaican slur for a homosexual.
Id.
168. Id. at 873.
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parently, the immigration judge does not know the meaning of
bisexual.”169
A similar example involving a lesbian identity claim comes from the
Eleventh Circuit. In this case, Ingrida Mockeviciene sought asylum
based on her sexuality.170 She submitted substantial evidence that she
had been persecuted in her home country because she was a lesbian,
including evidence that she was assaulted by the police, evicted from
her house, and beaten and raped by her husband while his friends held
her down.171 She also submitted letters from her friends stating that
they knew she was a lesbian and that the police harmed her because of
her orientation.172 Her daughter’s testimony also corroborated her
allegations.173
However, the IJ found that Mockeviciene’s claim that she was a
lesbian was not credible.174 He based his finding primarily on the fact
that she never had a same-sex partner and was “[a]t best . . . a nonpracticing lesbian.”175 He also noted that she had “not joined any
groups while being here in the United States for four years that involve[d] lesbian activities” and had no documents supporting her allegations regarding the police violence she endured.176 The BIA did not
explicitly adopt the IJ’s reasoning, but it affirmed the decision based
on Mockeviciene’s marriage to a man because the marriage undercut
her lesbian identity claim.177 The Eleventh Circuit was “skeptical”
about the IJ’s reasoning but held that “[g]iven Mockeviciene’s recent
marriage, the evidence does not compel reversal of the BIA’s credibility determination.”178 Just like in Fuller, Mockeviciene’s marriage to a
man negated the other evidence supporting her lesbian identity claim,
i.e., it estopped her from claiming a lesbian identity.179
These two cases show courts’ heavy, and sometimes illogical, reliance on prior sexual relationships as a proxy for sexual orientation.
Even though Fuller and Mockeviciene had been in relationships with
people of a different sex, they put forth other evidence showing that
169. Id. at 874 (emphasis in original).
170. Mockeviciene v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 237 Fed. App’x 569, 570 (11th Cir. 2007).
171. Id. at 570–71.
172. Id. at 571.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 572.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 573.
178. Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
179. Id.; see also Eke v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2008). In Eke, the court
held that the BIA and IJ did not err by determining that Eke was not gay because he
did not provide any “documentation indicating his sexual preferences, such as letters,
affidavits, photographs, or other forms of corroborative evidence,” or his sexual orientation; the courts reached this conclusion even though Eke testified that he was in a
long term relationship with a man, was harassed due to his sexual orientation, and was
pressured to marry a woman who, after discovering that he was gay, ended the relationship. Eke, 512 F.3d at 375–76, 381.
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they would face persecution in their home country based on their sexual orientation. These courts, however, seemed to care more about
whether they were “really” the sexuality they claimed to be, as opposed to than the legally relevant question about likelihood of persecution based on sexual orientation.180
Other courts take a different approach and adjudicate sexual orientation by looking to the petitioner’s perceived sexual orientation in
their home country. This approach is not focused on determining the
petitioner’s actual sexual orientation but rather, examines how the petitioner’s potential persecutors will understand or perceive their sexuality—which is similar to the anti-discrimination cases that focus on
how the alleged discriminator perceived the plaintiff’s identity. The
Third Circuit took this approach in Amanfi v. Ashcroft.181 In Amanfi,
the petitioner had sex with another man to avoid being ritually sacrificed, but after he was spared, he was harassed because people believed he was gay.182 The court held that this constituted imputed
membership in the LGBT community and remanded the case for further proceedings.183 Other courts of appeal have also held that perceived sexuality can be grounds for immigration relief under similar
reasoning.184
2. Religion
Religious identity adjudication in the context of benefit laws has
constitutional limits, unlike other identity claims.185 Under the “relig180. While courts treat the sex of someone’s sexual partners as highly probative of
sexual orientation in this context, courts generally do not permit IJs to consider appearance and mannerisms (i.e. ascriptive evidence) when adjudicating sexual orientation. See Shahinaj v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1027, 1029 (8th Cir. 2007) (reversing the IJ’s
finding that Shahinaj was not gay based on the IJ’s “personal and improper opinion
Shahinaj did not dress or speak like or exhibit the mannerisms of a homosexual” and
“Shahinaj’s lack of membership in any Albanian homosexual organizations”);
Razkane v. Holder, 562 F.3d 1283, 1288 (10th Cir. 2009) (rejecting IJ’s determination
that the petitioner was not gay based on the fact that the petitioner did not “dress in
an effeminate manner or affect any effeminate mannerisms” and reasoning that the
IJ’s reliance on his own views of the appearance, dress, and affect of a homosexual
“elevate[d] stereotypical assumptions,” which could “lead to unpredictable, inconsistent, and unreviewable results”).
181. Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 2003).
182. Id. at 722–23.
183. Id. at 730.
184. See, e.g., Velasquez-Banegas v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 258, 259–60, 264 (7th Cir.
2017) (holding that petitioner was likely to be regarded as gay in his home country
because he was HIV positive and had never married and vacating BIA’s denial of his
withholding of removal); Pozos v. Gonzales, 141 F. App’x 629, 632–33 (9th Cir.
2005) (holding that the petitioner had a well-founded fear of persecution based on his
perceived sexual orientation, even though he claimed that he was not actually gay).
185. This doctrine can also come up in anti-discrimination laws, or any laws, not
just benefit laws. But because religious identity claims are not very rigorously interrogated in other contexts, and are more intensely examined in benefit laws, this doctrine
is most relevant in the benefit law analysis.
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ious question doctrine,” the First Amendment prevents courts from
evaluating the accuracy of someone’s religious beliefs; however,
courts may adjudicate the sincerity of those beliefs.186 In other words,
courts cannot determine whether someone is Catholic based on their
belief in or adherence to some set of “objective” Catholic tenants—
someone can be wrong about what it means to be Catholic and still be
Catholic. But courts can determine whether someone sincerely identifies with Catholicism and whether they actually believe that their faith
mandates a particular belief or action. This doctrine prevents religious
identity from being as closely interrogated as other identity claims because individuals do not need to meet a certain set of predetermined
criteria to prove their identity. Despite the religious question doctrine,
the law requires religious identity adjudication for benefit laws in a
number of legal contexts.187 This Article focuses on asylum to limit
this Article’s scope and to have some doctrinal consistency in this
section.
Asylum seekers can generally prove their religious identity by submitting documentary evidence and testifying about their beliefs. For
instance, one petitioner sought asylum on the grounds that he had
converted from Islam to Christianity.188 He submitted documentary
evidence of his conversion, including a letter from his current pastors
confirming his faith and baptism, and a certificate of his baptism.189
This evidence was sufficient to assure both the BIA and the Ninth
Circuit that this was “not a case that presents any palpable risk of
admitting any fraudulent claims on the basis of a phony religious conversion.”190 Similar cases abound.191
186. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86–88 (1944); see also Nathan S. Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1185, 1187–88 (2017); Ben
Adams & Cynthia Barmore, Questioning Sincerity: The Role of the Courts After
Hobby Lobby, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 59, 59–60 (2014) (“There is a long tradition
of courts competently scrutinizing asserted religious beliefs for sincerity without delving into their validity or verity.”).
187. See, e.g., Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86–87 (1944) (criminal law); Witmer v. United
States, 348 U.S. 375, 378–82 (1955) (conscientious objector to war); Andreola v.
Glass, No. 04-C-282, 2006 WL 2645186, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 13, 2006) (prisoner’s
rights); Dobkin v. District of Columbia, 194 A.2d 657, 659 (D.C. 1963) (relief from
criminal conviction); Ideal Life Church of Lake Elmo v. Cnty. of Washington, 304
N.W.2d 308, 310–13 (Minn. 1981) (tax exemptions for churches).
188. See Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 2009).
189. Id. at 1346.
190. Id. at 1356.
191. See Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 89–93 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the petitioner sufficiently proved that he converted to Christianity when he submitted his
certificate of baptism, an unsworn affidavit from a priest, a letter from his congregation confirming his membership, and a letter from his sister about his conversion);
Jiang v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 992, 995, 997–98 (7th Cir. 2007) (reversing IJ’s decision
that petitioner was not a “real Christian” based on his limited knowledge of Christianity); Cosa v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1066, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2008) (reversing IJ’s determination that petitioner was not a Millenist when petitioner submitted declarations from
the leader of her Millenist group and fellow Millenists and IJ’s finding was based on
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Like with sexual orientation, some courts focus on whether the petitioner will be persecuted based on an imputed/perceived religious belief or identity rather than whether the petitioner’s religious claim is
sincere. These courts examine how the petitioner’s identity would be
understood by those likely to persecute them and are “not as concerned with the heart of the convert.”192 For example, in Bastanipour
v. I.N.S., the BIA found that the petitioner had not presented sufficient evidence that he had converted to Christianity from Islam in part
because he was never baptized, was not a member of a church, and
had requested a pork-free diet in prison.193 The Seventh Circuit reversed and reasoned that the BIA’s focus should not have been on
whether BIA itself thought the petitioner had converted to Christianity, but on whether the petitioner had converted to Christianity in the
eyes of those set to punish him for his conversion if he returned to his
home country.194
The petitioner’s actual religion was not important in this case.
Rather, even if he was lying about his religious beliefs, under the
court’s reasoning, he could still be eligible for immigration relief as
long as he would be persecuted based on his claimed religious belief.195 Under this approach, both a petitioner who actually subscribes
to her asserted religious belief and one who is faking religious conversion for opportunist reasons are treated the same way for purposes of
asylum and similar forms of religion-based immigration relief.
3. Race
Many scholars have examined the history of racial adjudication in
the context of what this Article defines as benefit laws. This important
work elucidates law’s significant role in drawing and enforcing strict
boundaries around whiteness, which, in turn, ensured that individuals
who the courts did not understand to be white did not gain access to
the benefits reserved for those who were “actually” white.196
petitioner’s doctrinal knowledge of the religion). There are cases where petitioners’
religious claims are rejected even when they provide documentary evidence to support their identities; the documentary evidence in these cases, however, appears weak.
See Mendoza v. I.N.S., 28 F. App’x 586, 587 (8th Cir. 2002) (The documentary evidence was a statement from the mayor of petitioner’s former town, and the petitioner
testified that he did not know the mayor.); Mejia-Paiz v. I.N.S., 111 F.3d 720, 724 (9th
Cir. 1997) (affidavit from the petitioner’s brother did not provide any basis for his
knowledge that petitioner was a Jehovah’s Witness).
192. Najafi v. I.N.S., 104 F.3d 943, 949 (7th Cir. 1997).
193. Bastanipour v. I.N.S., 980 F.2d 1129, 1132–33 (7th Cir. 1992).
194. Id. at 1133.
195. Id. at 1132–33. The court was open to the argument that “a nonbelieving
Christian is not really a Christian and thus does not fall within the scope of the asylum
statute.” Id. But the BIA did not deny the asylum application on those grounds, so
the court did not determine the validity of that argument. Id.
196. Until fairly recently, many laws explicitly required individuals to either be
white or to not be a disfavored racial minority to gain access to a variety of legal
benefits. Racial identity determined individuals’ eligibility to enter the United States
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This Article, on the other hand, focuses on modern race adjudication in the context of benefit laws.197 The benefit laws discussed in this
Subsection include judicial adjudication of eligibility for governmentordered affirmative action programs, programs for contracting with
businesses owned by racial minorities, and the distribution of settlement funds from a race discrimination lawsuit to racial minorities.
This Subsection only focuses on affirmative action in the context of an
adversarial proceeding, where a court or other adjudicative body determines someone’s eligibility for a particular program. It does not
include affirmative action in contexts like university admissions,
where a court is not adjudicating race through an adversarial
process.198
Modern racial adjudication interrogates claims of racial identity
very closely, particularly when an individual’s racial identity claim
does not align with how others typically perceive their racial identity.
Legal actors consider ancestral and documentary evidence of race, as
well as proof that people in the individual’s community perceive them
as their claimed racial identity. Identity estoppel is another common
thread through these cases, and courts look to prior inconsistent racial
self-identification as evidence that the current racial identity claim is
false.

and be naturalized as United States citizens, whom they could marry, whether they
could vote, and whether they could be legally enslaved. LÓPEZ, supra note 26, at
11–13; see also Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in
the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 120–23 (1998) (examining the racial
determination cases in the nineteenth century).
197. The goals of the modern benefit laws are markedly different than the ones at
issue in older race-litigation cases. While the latter were intended to maintain strict
racial boundaries in service of white supremacy, the former, at least on their face, are
generally about remediation for prior discrimination or racial diversity.
198. Racial adjudication in university admissions and similar contexts is often not
very transparent and therefore difficult to evaluate. Decisionmakers likely consider
some combination of self-identification, membership in affinity groups, physical appearance (through an Internet search or a personal interview), and evidence in the
personal essay. However, there is usually no formal racial adjudication in this context,
and the weight decisionmakers give to these various forms of evidence is not clear.
Additionally, as scholars have noted, universities and employers who are interested in
having racial diversity at their institutions have little incentive to adjudicate race. The
broader their racial definitions and the less they scrutinize racial identity claims, the
better their chances of claiming more diversity. See Camille Gear Rich, Affirmative
Action in the Era of Elective Race: Racial Commodification and the Promise of the
New Functionalism, 102 GEO. L.J. 179, 196 (2013) [hereinafter Racial Commodification and the Promise of the New Functionalism] (“The institution or employer is incentivized to accept even the most weak racial-identity claims as it will get the benefit of
an employee it can categorize as a minority worker for diversity-reporting purposes
without having to do the work necessary to reach out to more acutely subordinated
workers from heavily racialized minority communities.”); Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2156 (2013) (explaining how employers commodify
their employees’ race to their advantage).
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One of the most frequently discussed cases in the context of a raceconscious hiring program is Malone v. Civil Service Commission.199 In
Malone, two brothers applied to the Boston fire department and selfidentified as white on their applications.200 They were not hired because their scores on the entrance exam were too low.201 The brothers
applied a second time but, this time, identified themselves as Black on
their applications.202 Under the fire department’s court-ordered affirmative action program, the passing score on the entrance exam for
Black applicants was lower than for white applicants.203 The Malone
brothers were subsequently hired.204 About ten years later, the commissioner of the fire department suspected that the brothers had lied
about their race on their applications, and a hearing officer was appointed to determine whether the commissioner’s suspicions were
correct.205
After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the officer concluded that the
brothers were not Black and were not eligible for the affirmative action program.206 There was no pre-existing test to determine racial
identity, so the officer developed the following three-part test herself:
“(i) visual observation of physical features; (ii) documentary evidence
establishing black ancestry, such as birth certificates; and (iii) evidence
that the Malones or their families held themselves out to be black and
are considered black in the community.”207 Or in the terms of this
Article, (1) ascriptive race as determined by the adjudicator, (2) ancestral evidence, and (3) ascriptive race as determined by third
parties.208
As to the first factor, the officer found that the Malones did not
appear to be Black to her because they had “fair skin, fair hair coloring, and Caucasian facial features.”209 For the second factor, the
brothers submitted a picture of a woman who they claimed was their
Black great-grandmother.210 However, the officer discounted this evidence because they could not prove that the woman in the picture was
Black.211 The officer instead relied on other evidence indicating that
199. Malone v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 646 N.E.2d 150 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
200. Id. at 151 n.3.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 151.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 151, 151 n.4.
208. Racial Commodification and the Promise of the New Functionalism, supra note
198, at 199 (citing Malone v. Haley, No. 88-339, slip op. at 16 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct.
Suffolk Cnty. July 25, 1989)). If the Malone brothers could not satisfy these criteria,
they could still prevail if they genuinely believed they were Black. See id. at 205.
209. Id.
210. Malone, 646 N.E.2d at 152 n.5.
211. Racial Commodification and the Promise of the New Functionalism, supra note
198, at 206.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-2\TWL206.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 41

ADJUDICATING IDENTITY

10-MAR-22

14:18

307

they were not Black, including (1) the brothers’ and their family members’ birth certificates stating that they were all white, and (2) the
brothers’ self-identifications as white in their first job applications and
a subsequent application for a promotion to lieutenant.212 Finally, the
officer found that the brothers were not considered part of the Black
community, pointing out that they had not joined the African-American firefighters group and that they did not hold themselves out to be
Black.213
Compared to sexual orientation and religion adjudication, the level
of scrutiny exacted on the brothers’ racial identity claims was high.
Over a two-day hearing, the officer took into account ascriptive evidence, multiple forms of documentary evidence, and ancestral evidence.214 She evaluated their physical appearances, various birth
certificates, and how they represented their race to others.215 Identity
estoppel also played a role in this case—the hearing officer considered
their previous identifications as white as an indication that their Black
racial identity claim was false.216 The Malone brothers’ claims that
they were Black, which may have been supported by some documentary evidence, could not overcome their prior and subsequent inconsistent self-identifications, conflicting documentary evidence, and
their physical appearances.217
More than 20 years after Malone, another racial identity claim was
interrogated with similar intensity. This case, Orion Insurance Group
v. Washington State Office of Minority & Women’s Business Enterprises, involved the Small Business Administration’s 8(a) program.
This program provides government contracting opportunities to small
businesses that are “owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals,” also known as Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (“DBE”).218 “Socially disadvantaged individuals are
those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural
bias” within American society “because of their identity as member of
a group without regard to their individual identity.”219 The relevant
regulation provides that most racial minorities are presumptively “socially disadvantaged individuals.”220
212. Id. at 206–07.
213. Id. at 208–09.
214. Malone, 646 N.E.2d at 151.
215. Id. at 151–52.
216. Racial Commodification and the Promise of the New Functionalism, supra note
198, at 207.
217. Id. at 205–10.
218. Orion Ins. Grp. v. Wash. State Off. of Minority & Women’s Bus. Enters., No.
16-5582, 2017 WL 3387344, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 7, 2017), aff’d sub nom. Orion Ins.
Grp. v. Wash.’s Off. of Minority & Women’s Bus. Enters., 754 F. App’x 556 (9th Cir.
2018); 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(A)–(D).
219. 15 § 637(a)(5); see also 49 C.F.R. § 26, App. E (2020).
220. 49 C.F.R. § 26.67(a) (2020).
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Ralph Taylor sought a DBE designation for his company on the
basis that he was presumptively socially disadvantaged because he was
Black and Native American.221 In his initial application, Taylor submitted the following evidence to support his asserted identity claims:
(1) a genetic ancestry test stating that he was 90% European, 6% Indigenous American, and 4% Sub-Saharan African; (2) a copy of his
driver’s license with his picture on it; (3) his birth certificate stating
that his parents are “Caucasian” but not providing his race; (4) a letter
from his father asking that his birth certificate be changed to reflect
that he is “Caucasian, African, and American Indian;” (5) his father’s
genetic results, estimating that he was 44% European, 44% SubSaharan African, and 12% East Asian; and (6) a death certificate from
a Virginia woman who was presumably related to Taylor identifying
her as a “Negro.”222 The law does not require DNA or other ancestral
evidence to show membership in an identity category. Taylor presumably provided this evidence because he looked white in his
photograph.223
The relevant regulation permits the agency to ask for additional evidence of an identity claim if the agency has a “well[-]founded reason
to question the individual’s claim of membership in that group.”224
Based on Taylor’s appearance and his DNA test results, the agency
asked for additional evidence that Taylor was Black and/or Native
American.225 In response, Taylor submitted the following: (1) evidence connecting the Virginia woman to his mother’s side of the family; (2) a birth certificate from a relative, born in 1914, whose father’s
race is listed as “white?”; (3) a statement that he “considered himself
to be Black based on his DNA test results, that he joined the NAACP,
subscribed to Ebony magazine, and has ‘taken a great interest in
Black social causes;’” and (4) letters from individuals stating that they
considered him a person of “mixed race” or “mixed heritage.”226
When considering this additional evidence, the agency “must consider whether the person has held himself out to be a member of the
group over a long period of time prior to application for certification
and whether the person is regarded as a member of the group by the
relevant community.”227 The agency may also “require the applicant
to produce appropriate documentation of group membership.”228 The
agency found that he was not Black because none of the evidence he
221. Orion Ins. Grp., 2017 WL 3387344, at *2.
222. Id.
223. Ex. Selection of Admin. Rec. at 1–2, Orion Ins. Grp. v. Wash. State Off. of
Minority & Women’s Bus. Enters., No. 16-5582, 2017 WL 3387344 (W.D. Wash. Aug.
7, 2017) (No. 16-5581), 2017 WL 3387344 [hereinafter Ex. Selection of Admin.].
224. 49 C.F.R. § 26.63(a)(1) (2020).
225. Orion Ins. Grp., 2017 WL 3387344, at *3.
226. Id. at *10–11.
227. 49 C.F.R. § 26.63(b) (2020).
228. Id.
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produced showed that he “ever held himself out to be Black, that he
ever was perceived in the business community as Black, or that he
ever suffered any adverse consequences because people with whom he
wished to engage in business refused to do business with him because
they perceived him as Black.”229
Taylor appealed, and the district court affirmed, holding that the
agency did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it found that Taylor
provided insufficient evidence that he was either Black or Native
American.230 Interestingly, Taylor also applied for the state version of
the federal DBE program.231 Washington State initially denied his application, but after he appealed, the state voluntarily reversed its decision and classified Taylor’s business as a Minority Business Enterprise
(“MBE”).232
Compared to the Malone brothers, Taylor provided more evidence
of his claim to Blackness, including ancestral evidence and evidence
that at least some individuals regarded him as multiracial.233 But like
the Malone brothers, he did not ascriptively appear to be Black to the
adjudicator.234 Also like the Malone brothers, he had previously identified as white (before receiving his DNA test results),235 and in both
cases, the adjudicators took these prior inconsistent racial identifications as evidence that they were not Black.236 That is, Taylor and the
Malone brothers were estopped from claiming a Black identity based
on prior inconsistent self-identifications.
Courts have invoked identity estoppel in other benefit cases involving racial identity claims. For instance, the United States settled a lawsuit against an employer based on the employer’s discrimination
against certain racial minorities, and the benefits of the settlement
were reserved for the racial minorities that the employer had discriminated against.237 Membership in a racial minority for the purpose of
229. Ex. Selection of Admin., supra note 223, at 3–4.
230. Orion Ins. Grp., 2017 WL 3387344, at *8.
231. Id. at *2.
232. Id.
233. Compare id. at *3, with supra discussion accompanying notes 209–13 (describing the evidence presented by the Malone brothers).
234. Compare Orion Ins. Grp., 2017 WL 3387344, at *10, with supra discussion accompanying note 209–13 (describing the adjudicator’s findings regarding the Malone
brothers’ ascriptive appearances). The agency stated that Taylor appeared to be white
according to his driver’s license picture. Ex. Selection of Admin., supra note 223, at 1.
235. Id.; Orion Ins. Grp., 2017 WL 3387344, at *2 (stating that Taylor received his
DNA results on August 25, 2010, and subsequently applied for his company’s certification as an MBE under Washington State law on April 19, 2013); see also Racial
Commodification and the Promise of the New Functionalism, supra note 198, at 207.
236. Orion Ins. Grp., 2017 WL 3387344, at *8; Malone v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 646
N.E.2d 150, 151 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
237. See United States v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 85 F. Supp. 2d 130, 133, 135–36
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (summarizing the central terms of the parties’ Agreement, including
providing “permanent civil service status to 43 identified blacks, Hispanics, Asians,
and women” who had been serving as provisional employees and further providing
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distributing the settlement funds was determined by how individuals
had identified their race or national origin on their job applications.238
Individuals who marked “white” on their job applications were excluded from the settlement, and some of those individuals subsequently objected to their exclusion, claiming that they were not
white.239 The employer reexamined whether these objectors were misclassified as white for purposes of the settlement and reclassified
some, but not all, of them.240 The remaining objectors sought relief
from the court, but the court refused to second-guess the employer’s
racial classifications and held that their “self-identifications as white
[were] sufficient to exclude them from the benefits of the
settlement.”241
The court appeared wary of engaging in any identity adjudication of
its own, stating that it would be “unnecessary, and would be extremely
unwise, for this court to . . . attempt to engage in the dubious task of
defining or categorizing any person’s race or national origin.”242 However, by allowing prior inconsistent racial self-identification to estop
these objectors from asserting a different identity claim, the court was
adjudicating identity by assuming that the racial identity asserted on
the employees’ application was accurate for the purposes of this
settlement.
In sum, racial identity claims can be highly scrutinized in the context of a benefit law—especially when someone’s self-identification
does not align with other identity evidence (like appearance or prior
inconsistent self-identifications). Prior inconsistent racial identification is also salient in racial adjudication and may estop individuals
from making a successful racial identity claim.
4. Sex
This Subsection examines two legal contexts in which the law determines eligibility for something or access to something based on
whether someone is sufficiently male or female.243 Those contexts are
(1) being able to change a sex marker on a birth certificate and (2)
“retroactive seniority, including retroactive pension relief, to 54 identified black, Hispanic, Asian, and female incumbent” employees (emphasis in original)).
238. Id. at 153.
239. Id.
240. See id. The filings do not explain what criteria the employer used to reclassify
the employees.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. I recognize that using the term “benefit law” in the context of sex adjudication
feels like a misnomer more so than with other identities. Not allowing someone to
change their sex designation because of their sex seems more like discrimination than
a benefit. These laws fall under this category because, in contrast to anti-discrimination laws, these laws are not about addressing prior instances of discrimination;
rather, they are forward looking and require proof of “sex” for the government to
take a certain action.
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participating in sex-segregated sports.244 For someone to prove their
sex in these contexts, the burden of proof is usually relatively high.
Self-identification is not enough, and people generally need to show
biological and/or documentary evidence of their sex. Sex adjudication
in benefit laws, like with anti-discrimination laws, is most visible in
cases involving transgender people because transgender people are
more likely to need the state to adjudicate their sex.
Laws regulating changes to sex markers on birth certificates may
seem more like data-collection laws than benefit laws, at least at first
blush. Unlike data-collection laws, birth certificates are a primary legal mechanism through which the state exercises its power to assign a
sex classification, and this legal sex designation is extremely consequential for individuals.245 A birth certificate is often used to obtain
most other identity documents, including driver’s licenses and passports.246 These identity documents facilitate access to a wide variety of
institutions and programs, including schools, insurance, financial institutions, air travel, and much more.247 Thus, when someone’s sex
marker on these documents is incorrect, their ability to access the services they need is likely to be impaired. So when the state regulates
changing sex markers on birth certificates, the state is not collecting
data about sex—it is adjudicating whether someone is sufficiently
“male” or “female” for the state to recognize them as such and grant
them access to a correct birth certificate.248
States regulate birth certificates, and many states require that an
individual modify their anatomy in some way to amend their sex
244. Other legal contexts in which sex is adjudicated include determining who is
sufficiently “male” or “female” to access a particular bathroom. See, e.g., Grimm v.
Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 619 (4th Cir. 2020) (finding that Grimm was
a “boy” and could use the boy’s restroom). As discussed, addressing all laws that
adjudicate identity is beyond the scope of this Article, and future work can explore
these areas.
245. On a more abstract level, a sex designation is required for personhood. Someone cannot operate in current society without a legal sex classification. As Judith Butler has posited, “the moment in which an infant becomes humanized is when the
question, ‘is it a boy or a girl?’ is answered.” BODIES THAT MATTER, supra note 122,
at 111.
246. Lisa Mottet, Modernizing State Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to Ensure
Accurate Gender Markers on Birth Certificates: A Good Government Approach to
Recognizing the Lives of Transgender People, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 373, 391
(2013).
247. See id. at 392 (“Birth certificates establish initial gender designation for other
government identify documents, such as driver’s licenses, passports and Social Security records. The birth certificate, as well as these other government documents, in turn
breed many other identity documents, such as school records, college ID cards, work
identification, and commercial licenses.”).
248. See Katyal, supra note 58, at 412 (describing how “being ‘sexed’ or classified
by the state . . . confer[s] the benefits of recognition on individuals who fit the morphological model and den[ies] certain entitlements, particularly recognition, to those
who transgress or who do not fulfill the regulatory requirements for transition”).
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marker.249 Lisa Mottet surveyed all 50 states in 2013, and at the time,
27 states required surgery by statute, regulation, or policy.250 Other
states do not have a codified policy that regulates sex marker changes,
but in practice, individuals must submit proof of some form of sex
reassignment surgery.251 More recent 50-state surveys confirm that
about half of states require some form of surgery to change sex markers on birth certificates.252 A handful of states have broader language
but still require proof of some clinical treatment.253 Vermont, for instance, requires that the individual has “undergone surgical, hormonal, or other treatment appropriate for that individual for the purpose
of gender transition.”254
For some states that require proof of surgery, not just any surgery
will do. According to Mottet’s research, some agencies “have strict
(generally unwritten) rules that a particular surgery must be
shown.”255 And in other jurisdictions, a judge determines what type of
surgery is required.256 Individuals who have had surgeries that change
their genitalia are more likely to successfully change their sex
marker.257 For instance, approximately 80% of trans men who had
surgery to create a penis received a corrected birth certificate, compared with 56% who just had top surgery.258 Similarly, 74% of trans
women who had a vaginoplasty or had their scrotum and testes removed received a corrected birth certificate, whereas 32% of those
who had only breast surgery received a corrected birth certificate.259
These statutes adjudicating sex for birth certificates can be understood as extreme examples of the law’s use of identity estoppel. Prior
identification as one sex (or perhaps more accurately, assignment at
birth to one sex by a third party) makes it very difficult to claim a
different sex.260 If someone claiming to be a man was assigned female
249. This Article focuses on birth certificates, as opposed to other documents, because a birth certificate is required to obtain most other identity document (driver’s
licenses, Social Security cards, passports) or change sex markers on those identity
documents. Mottet, supra note 245, at 391–93.
250. Id. at 400–01.
251. Id. at 401.
252. See Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations: State-by-State Guidelines,
LAMBDA LEGAL https://www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/article/trans-changing-birth-certificate-sex-designations (Sept. 17, 2018) [https://perma.cc/4U4F-6GNH]
[hereinafter LAMBDA LEGAL].
253. Mottet, supra note 246, at 400.
254. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5112(b) (West, Westlaw through Acts 1 through 76
(end) & M-1 through M-6 (end) of Reg. Sess. & Act 1 (end) of Special Sess. of
2021–2022 Vt. Gen. Assemb. (2021)).
255. Mottet, supra note 246, at 401.
256. Id.
257. See id. at 390 nn. 63–65.
258. Id. at 390 n.61.
259. Id.
260. See, e.g., Sandy E. James et al., The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, TRANSEQUALITY.ORG 86 (Dec. 2016), https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/
docs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf [https://perma.cc/4K8X-FRJ3] (“More than
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at birth and previously identified as a girl or woman, these laws estop
him from claiming a male sex identity, unless he makes substantial
changes to his body. Unlike racial identification, where prior inconsistent identification was just one of many factors that adjudicators considered,261 prior inconsistent sex identifications make claiming a
different sex identity in this context very costly.262
The second context examined in this Subsection is the adjudication
of sex for sex-segregated sports. How sex is determined for sports varies widely across the country, depending on the sport, level (youth/
collegiate/professional), and jurisdiction. Thus, for scope purposes, I
focus on two examples: one that is considered more inclusive of transgender athletes (the NCAA rule) and one that essentially bans transgender women and girls from participating in sex-segregated sports
(an Idaho law).263 From 2011 until the end of January 2022, the
NCAA rule deemed a transgender woman sufficiently “female” to
participate on a women’s team if she had “complet[ed] one calendar
year of testosterone suppression treatment.”264A transgender man
was able to participate on a men’s team, but not a women’s team, if
he was taking testosterone.265 If a transgender athlete was not taking
hormones, their sex was determined based on their sex assigned at
birth.266 While the presence or absence of hormones, and testosterone
in particular, was key to sex determinations for the NCAA, hormones
were not the only thing at play.267 The NCAA’s policy only addressed
the testosterone levels of transgender athletes—it did not require cisgender women to have their testosterone levels checked to join a wotwo-thirds (68%) of respondents did not have any ID or record that reflected both the
name and gender they preferred.”).
261. See, e.g., Malone v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 646 N.E.2d 150, 151, 155 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1995).
262. See, e.g., Megan Brodie Maier, Altering Gender Markers on Government Identity Documents: Unpredictable, Burdensome, and Oppressive, 23 U. PA. J.L. & SOC.
CHANGE 203, 229 (2020) (summarizing barriers to changing documentation due to
cost).
263. Unlike other identity adjudicators in this Article, the NCAA is not a state
actor. Tarkanian v. NCAA, 488 U.S. 179, 196-97 (1988). Nevertheless, I chose to examine the NCAA’s rule for two reasons. First, the NCAA rule applies nationwide;
how state actors adjudicate sex in other contexts, like K–12 sex-segregated sports, for
instance, is dependent on the particular school district and thus not applicable to as
many athletes as the NCAA rule. In a forthcoming article, legal scholar Scott SkinnerThompson provides a detailed analysis of how sex is regulated in K–12 sports in each
state and each state’s largest school district. See Scott Skinner-Thompson, Identity by
Committee (manuscript in progress) (on file with author). Second, the NCAA’s policy, before its recent amendment, was considered one of the most trans-inclusive policies for sex-segregated sports; therefore, the forthcoming critiques of this policy
would apply with at least equal force to most other policies.
264. PAT GRIFFIN & HELEN CARROLL, NCAA, NCAA INCLUSION OF TRANSSTUDENT-ATHLETES 13 (2011), https://www.ncaapublications.com/
GENDER
DownloadPublication.aspx?download=11INCL.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5TL-67FP].
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See id.
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men’s team.268 The only athletes who had their sex adjudicated were
transgender athletes whose sex assigned at birth was different from
the sex of the team they wish to play on.269 Thus, sex adjudication in
this context was dependent on two things: (1) transgender status, and
(2) presence or absence of testosterone.
On January 19, 2022, the NCAA changed its rule and adopted a
sport-by-sport approach to sex adjudication.270 Specifically, “the updated NCAA policy calls for transgender participation for each sport
to be determined by the policy for the national governing body
[(“NGB”)] of that sport.”271 If there is no “NGB policy for a sport,
that sport’s international federation policy [is] followed,” and “[i]f
there is no international federation policy, previously established IOC
policy criteria [are] followed.”272 Some NGBs do not currently have
rules addressing requirements for participation in sex-segregated
sports and will likely be adopting such policies in the coming weeks
and months.273
Although this rule change has created much uncertainty regarding
sex determinations in collegiate sports, there is reason to believe that
sport-specific rules will mirror the NCAA’s former rule and use testosterone levels to determine whether an athlete is sufficiently “female” to participate in women’s sports. First, many NGBs that
currently have applicable rules use testosterone levels to determine
eligibility for women’s sports.274 Additionally, the NCAA seems to
anticipate that testosterone levels will continue to play a major role;
its press release stated that “[t]ransgender student-athletes will need
to document sport-specific testosterone levels beginning four weeks
before their sport’s championship selections.”275
While the NCAA’s rule will likely continue to rely mostly on testosterone levels, the “Fairness in Women’s Sports Act” Idaho recently
passed imposes a far more rigorous test for sex determination in
268. See id.
269. See id. at 13, 22.
270. Press Release, NCAA Bd. of Governors, Board of Governors Updates Transgender Participation Policy (Jan. 19, 2022, 8:41 PM), https://www.ncaa.org/news/2022/
1/19/media-center-board-of-governors-updates-transgender-participation-policy.aspx
[https://perma.cc/RLM3-P754] [hereinafter NCAA Updated Policy].
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. For example, USA Swimming, the NGB for college swimming, released a
statement after the NCAA rule change stating that although there is currently no
policy on the books regarding transgender athletes, it is working with the International Swimming Federation to adopt one and expects to release it soon. Sarah
Berman, USA Swimming Releases Statement on Transgender Athlete Inclusion, SWIMSWAM (Jan. 20, 2022), https://swimswam.com/usa-swimming-releases-statement-ontransgender-athlete-inclusion/ [https://perma.cc/28FR-CXG7].
274. Policies by Organization, TRANSATHLETE.COM, https://www.transathlete.com/
policies-by-organization [https://perma.cc/WR24-G5ZZ] (listing rules for many NGBs
and other organizations).
275. NCAA Updated Policy, supra note 270.
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sports. The Act bars “students of the male sex” from participating in
women’s and girls’ sports and limits participation to students whose
“biological sex” is female.276 Its scope is extremely broad and applies
to all women/girl-only sports at most ages and levels, including intramural teams and teams sponsored by “primary schools.”277 The Act
permits an unnamed set of individuals to “dispute” the “biological
sex” of any student on an all-women’s team. A student whose sex is
challenged can prove their “biological sex” by providing documentation “signed by [their] personal health care provider” verifying “the
student’s reproductive anatomy, genetic makeup, or normal endogenously produced testosterone levels” (i.e. testosterone naturally produced by the body and not through hormone treatment).278 That is,
the Act excludes from the category of “female” any students (1) who
don’t have a vagina, uterus, ovaries (and other sex characteristics associated with a “female” sex), (2) whose chromosomes are not XX,
and (3) whose testosterone levels are naturally below a certain level,
regardless of whether they are taking testosterone-suppressing
hormones.279
The Act essentially excludes intersex individuals and transgender
women and girls from participating in girl’s/women’s sports. First,
most transgender students do not have the “reproductive anatomy”
associated with a “female sex” because they have not had genital surgery; even with surgery, transgender girls and women won’t have ovaries or a uterus. Second, transgender girls and women cannot change
their chromosomes. And third, by focusing on endogenously produced
hormones, the Act bars transgender athletes who are taking testosterone suppressants and therefore have circulating testosterone levels
like cisgender women. A federal district court has enjoined the Act on
the grounds that it likely violates both transgender and cisgender women’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause.280 The case is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit.281 Idaho is not alone in its
desire to exclude transgender students from single-sex sports and to
impose such strict and invasive methods for sex determinations; many
other states are currently considering similar legislation.282
276. IDAHO CODE § 33-6203(2).
277. Id. § 33-6203(1).
278. Id. § 33-6203(3).
279. See id.
280. Hecox v. Little, 479 F. Supp. 3d 930, 989 (D. Idaho 2020).
281. See Brief for Appellees Lindsay Hecox and Jane Doe, Hecox v. Little, 479 F.
Supp. 3d 930 (D. Idaho 2020) (Nos. 20-35813, 20-35815), 2020 WL 7634923, at *1.
282. See, e.g., S.B. 1046, 55th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2022) (determining “sex”
using the same criteria as the Idaho law); see also Take Action!: 2022 Sports Bills,
TRANSATHLETE.COM (Jan. 27, 2022), https://www.transathlete.com/take-action [https://
perma.cc/TLA3-NMNW] (listing similar bills in other states). The South Dakota legislature passed a very similar bill on February 1, 2022, and the governor could sign it
into law any day. Morgan Matzen, South Dakota House Passes Bills Limiting Transgender Students’ Access to Sports, Bathrooms, MSN (Feb. 1, 2022), https://
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Thus, sex adjudication in the context of sports, like with birth certificates, is determined based on biological evidence. Some rules adjudicate “female” sex based on current hormone levels, (like the NCAA’s
former policy) while others involve much more searching inquires that
include examination of genitals, chromosomes, and hormones, which
essentially limit the category of “female” to cisgender women.
D. Possible Explanations
The previous discussion showed how both the type of law and the
mutability of the identity category affect how closely identity claims
are scrutinized. It also exposed significant inconsistency in identity adjudication both across and within different areas of law. Yet courts
and other legal actors do not address or explain the principles they
employ when adjudicating identity or acknowledge these inconsistencies. Indeed, legal actors may not even be self-consciously aware that
they are adjudicating identity. This Section provides some possible
reasons why the level of interrogation into identity claims seems to be
correlated with the type of law and the mutability of the identity.
One reason legal actors interrogate identity differently based on the
type of law at issue may have something to do with balancing (1) a
perceived incentive to misrepresent an identity with (2) the cost to the
state of getting it wrong and (3) the cost of acquiring additional evidence. This framework does a good job explaining the different levels
of scrutiny in data-collection laws versus some benefit laws. For datacollection laws, individuals typically have little incentive to misrepresent their identity. For instance, someone’s decision to check “Hispanic” or “non-Hispanic” on the Census does not have any direct
effect on that individual.283 While that decision may affect how resources are distributed to the community at large, the link between
the individual choice and the effect on the group is attenuated.284 As
for the cost of error to the state, even if a small percentage of respondents did misstate their identity, these misstatements would not make
much of a difference in the aggregate.285 Combine this low incentive
to misrepresent and the low cost of misstatements with the massive
administrative burden of confirming large numbers of identity claims,
and data collection’s reliance on self-identification makes sense.
For many benefit laws—like asylum and affirmative action—identity adjudicators may think the incentives to “lie” about an identity
www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/south-dakota-house-passes-bills-limiting-transgender-students-access-to-sports-bathrooms/ar-AATnlVm [https://perma.cc/EWD29NRT].
283. See Mezey, supra note 63, at 1745.
284. See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, RESEARCH AND PLANS FOR COVERAGE MEASUREMENT IN THE 2010 CENSUS: INTERIM ASSESSMENT 2-2 (Robert Bell & Michael
Cohen eds., 2007).
285. Id. at 2-3.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-2\TWL206.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 51

ADJUDICATING IDENTITY

10-MAR-22

14:18

317

are high.286 Avoiding deportation or securing a government contract
are generally understood to be desirable, and unlike data-collection
laws, the identity claim does have a direct, and sometimes substantial,
effect on the individual.287 The cost to the government of getting it
wrong can also be higher than data-collection laws, but not always. If
a limited resource is involved (like a limited number of government
contracts), getting the identity claim wrong may mean that someone
who should have access to that resource, will not, which undermines
the benefit law’s function. Moreover, the administrative burdens of
adjudicating identity claims are lower than with data-collection laws
because of the reduced number of identity claims involved.
But for anti-discrimination laws, incentives to misrepresent an identity, the harms of error, and/or administrative burdens fail to adequately explain why courts interrogate these identity claims more
closely than data-collection identity claims. There is no apparent incentive to misstate an identity, like with benefit laws.288 The anti-discrimination laws in this Article are symmetrical, meaning that anyone
of any race, sex, religion, or sexuality can bring a claim, so plaintiffs
need not misstate their identity to bring a claim. For this same reason,
the cost of a court incorrectly adjudicating an identity claim is not
high. And like benefit laws, the costs of additional evidence are fairly
low.
Some scholars have hypothesized that legal actors (incorrectly)
think that the costs of getting an identity claim wrong is high—that is,
some judges may want to protect only those plaintiffs who are “actually” minorities.289 Under this view, anti-discrimination laws are
meant to protect minorities, so only those plaintiffs who are “actually”
members of the group the law intended to benefit should be allowed
to bring those claims. Consequently, judges with this perspective may
be more likely to interrogate an identity claim closely to ensure that
the law is being used to address discrimination against subordinated
or minority identities. I explain in the next Section why this concern is
unjustified both doctrinally and normatively, but this type of “protected class gatekeeping”290 may explain, at least partially, why iden286. See Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 2009);
Tseming Yang, Choice and Fraud in Racial Identification: The Dilemma of Policing
Race in Affirmative Action, the Census, and a Color-Blind Society, 11 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 367, 387 (2006).
287. Not all benefit laws come with such incentives, like laws governing sex markers on birth certificates. See Paisley Currah & Lisa Jean Moore, “We Won’t Know
Who You Are”: Contesting Sex Designations in New York City Birth Certificates, 24
HYPATIA 113, 114 (2009).
288. See supra Part III(C).
289. See Protected Class, supra note 27, at 156–57 (“It is perhaps this anti-subordination instinct, generally unstated, that motivates protected class gatekeeping, and
leads progressive jurists to continue to include language inviting protected class
gatekeeping in proposals to reform discrimination doctrine.”).
290. I borrow this term from Jessica Clarke. See id. at 101.
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tity is adjudicated more intensely in anti-discrimination laws than
data-collection laws.
Why mutability of identity affects how closely an identity is scrutinized evades easy explanation. But the perception that immutable
identities remain stable over time and are easily ascertainable based
on objective traits may help explain some patterns from the taxonomy.291 First, if legal actors understand immutable identities to be stable over time, they may be more likely to view inconsistent selfidentification as an indication of fraud rather than a legitimate change
in identity. In other words, if legal actors believe an identity cannot be
changed, and the individual previously said they were X, and now they
say they are Y, legal actors may think the individual is lying. This may
explain why identity estoppel tends to be more prevalent in the context of race and sex adjudication than religion or sexual orientation.
Consider the following example. Anna is a multiracial individual who
converted to Judaism from Christianity after getting married. Anna
marked her race as “white” when she applied for a job. Two years
later, her employer starts an affirmative action program for racial minorities, and Anna applies, stating that she self-identifies as multiracial. Her employer deems her ineligible because her prior selfidentification as white estops her from identifying as non-white, as
race is perceived to be immutable. This time, Anna sues her employer
for discriminating against her based on her Jewish identity. Her prior
self-identification as a Christian is not fatal to her assertion that she is
Jewish because religious identity is mutable, and therefore, her current assertion is not seen as fraudulent.
Indeed, fraud narratives about race and sex are both prevalent and
historically rooted. As for race, there is increasing societal concern
about college applicants identifying as minorities, even if that claim is
tenuous or false,292 or declining to indicate a racial identity,293 in
hopes of benefiting from the university’s affirmative action policy.
And historically, racial minorities have claimed a white identity to
avoid enslavement, become a citizen, or gain access to the numerous
other benefits that came with a legal declaration of whiteness.294 As
for sex, transgender individuals have long been deemed “gender
frauds.”295 For example, the “transsexual panic” defense to murdering
291. See, e.g., John Tehranian, Changing Race: Fluidity, Immutability, and the
Evolution of Equal-Protection Jurisprudence, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 7 (2019)
(showing how equal protection doctrine assumes race is immutable when, in fact, racial identity is “malleable and can change” due to a variety of factors).
292. Yang, supra note 286, at 369. Yang finds that this “appears to be most prevalent with respect to American Indian and Hispanic/Latino identities.” Id.
293. See, e.g., Camille Gear Rich, Decline to State: Diversity Talk and the American
Law Student, S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 539, 540 (2009) [hereinafter Decline to
State] (addressing law school applicants specifically).
294. See LÓPEZ, supra note 26, at 3, 27, 38, 44.
295. Currah & Moore, supra note 287, at 128.
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a transgender woman relied on the idea that the perpetrator was defrauded into thinking the victim was a woman based on her physical
appearance and then “justifiably” reacted violently when he discovered that she was “really” a man.296 More recently, opponents of laws
enabling transgender youth to participate in sex-segregated sports and
to use their chosen restroom have cited a concern that “boys” might
fraudulently claim that they are “girls” so that they can go into girls’
bathrooms or join girls’ sports teams.297 Although some of these societal narratives around race and sex fraud are problematic, they are salient and may help explain legal actors’ willingness to view inconsistent
identification as fraudulent.
Second, if legal actors think immutable identities are easily ascertainable through visual observation, or other “objective” evidence,
they might not be able to understand how someone could misperceive
another person’s identity.298 This may explain why courts are more
willing to reject discrimination claims involving racial misperception
claims than sexual orientation or religious misperception claims. D.
Wendy Greene has made this argument—that this fixed view of racial
identity may lead legal actors to reject a misperception claim because
they “may simply be unable to rationalize the proposition that a plaintiff’s race was mistaken” or “might outright disbelieve that a plaintiff’s
race could be mistaken, based on her own preset conceptualizations of
race and sex as fixed, indisputable constructs.”299
Third, and relatedly, if immutable identities are defined by “objective” traits, legal actors may interrogate these identities more closely
to ensure that an individual meets the legal actor’s “objective” criteria
for a particular identity. So if the law understands “objective” evidence of a “woman” or a “female” to include breasts and a vagina,
people without those traits will not be able to, for example, change
their sex marker on their birth certificate. This may also shed some
light on why some courts adjudicate racial identity claims based on socalled “objective” criteria but don’t do the same for the more mutable
identities, religion and sexual orientation, because unlike race, courts
may not have “objective” criteria that an individual must meet.

296. Id. at 120.
297. See e.g., Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 599 (4th Cir. 2020)
(noting community members’ justifications for opposing a student’s ability to use the
restroom matching their gender identity).
298. See Elective Race, supra note 61, at 1506 (“Because we are in a period of transition, many Americans still are wedded to fairly traditional attitudes about race. For
these Americans, race is still an objective, easily ascertainable fact determined by the
process of involuntary racial ascription—how one’s physical traits are racially categorized by third parties.”).
299. Greene, supra note 17, at 135.
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IV. CONTEXT-DETACHED & CONTEXT-INFORMED ADJUDICATION
This Part identifies a problematic pattern across the taxonomy of
identity adjudication. Specifically, it argues that legal actors tend to
adjudicate identity claims without considering why the identity is relevant to the law at issue. I call this a context-detached approach to
identity adjudication. A legal actor employing a context-detached approach does not adequately consider whether someone’s identity matters to the law in the first place. Nor does this legal actor use the
purpose of the law to inform what types of identity should be used to
adjudicate identity. A context-informed approach to identity adjudication, on the other hand, understands the identity question to depend
on why that particular law is asking the identity question in the first
place. It identifies the function or purpose of the applicable law first.
It then asks whether identity adjudication is necessary at all, and if so,
what definition or model of identity would best serve those purposes.
This Part addresses each type of law in turn and shows how legal
actors often fail to adjudicate identity with proper attention to the
function or purpose of the law. It also discusses what a context-informed approach might look like and summarizes the harms of context-detached adjudication, which tend to fall in two categories. First,
context-detached adjudication produces outcomes that are at odds
with the purpose of the law and often internally inconsistent with each
other. Second, context-detached adjudication can cause over-interrogation of identity, where legal actors examine more identity evidence
than necessary to fulfill the purpose of the law. Over-interrogation of
identity can harm individuals’ privacy and dignity interests and may
reinforce problematic definitions of identity through the power of the
law.
A. Data-Collection Laws
Data-collection laws almost exclusively rely on self-identification to
adjudicate identity. Yet as discussed, self-identification alone might
not be the right type of identity evidence, depending on the purpose
of the law at issue. If identity data is being collected to track discrimination, for instance, asking someone how they self-identify will only
track discrimination if their self-identification aligns with their ascriptive identity, or how their identity is understood or perceived in the
relevant community. A self-identified straight woman may be misperceived as a lesbian based on her appearance or mannerisms and
then discriminated against on that basis. The data-collection mechanism would not necessarily track this type of discrimination, however,
because she self-identified as straight. Thus, the current approach to
adjudicating identity for data-collection mechanisms used to track discrimination fails to adequately consider the purpose of the law.
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What might a context-informed approach to identity adjudication
for a data-collection mechanism meant to identify discrimination look
like? One option is to revert to older models where third parties assigned someone an identity based their appearance and/or identity
performance. This option has the advantage of relying on ascriptive
identity, which may be able to capture patterns of discrimination more
reliably than self-identification. But reverting to a system where third
parties assign identities to individuals does not seem like a desirable
or practical solution.300 First, this would not work for all identities—
for instance, how would a Census worker assign someone a sexual
orientation based on ascriptive evidence? Second, the identity would
be based on one person’s subjective determination, which may not reflect the identity the individuals is usually ascribed, and in turn, may
not be more accurate or reliable than self-identification. Third, and
most relevant to this discussion, third-party ascription does not necessarily align with the purpose of the law either. One reason federal
agencies abandoned third-party ascription in favor self-identification
was “[r]espect for individual dignity.”301 Dignity interests are not
served when individuals are involuntarily assigned a race, sex, sexuality, or religion.
A context-informed approach to identity adjudication would need
to reflect the anti-discrimination function of the law and the dignitary
interests the law seeks to protect. One approach that aligns with both
of these purposes is to change the substance of the questions asked to
reflect ascriptive identity. Rather than (or in addition to) asking people how they identify, ask people how others identify them. That is,
ask individuals how people in their community view their race, sex,
sexuality, etc. The question is not “what is your sexual orientation,”
for example, but rather, something like “what does your boss (or coworkers or community, depending on the context) understand your
sexual orientation to be.”302 This method of identity adjudication can
track discrimination patterns better than self-identification while
avoiding the dignity harms of involuntary identity ascription.
Data-collection mechanisms that have multiple purposes may need
to ask a variety of questions about someone’s identity to align with
300. See Mezey, supra note 63, at 1753 (explaining how very few racial minorities
want to return to a system where Census workers collect identity data through racial
ascription).
301. Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and
Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 58,782, 58,788–90 (Oct. 30, 1997). The Office of Management
and Budget (“OMB”) issued a directive to federal agencies stating that racial-datacollection efforts should facilitate self-identification to the greatest extent possible.
See id.; see also Elective Race, supra note 61, at 1505–06 (discussing how institutions
have increasingly valued dignity, privacy, and autonomy interests and how those interests are best served by a model that uses self-identification to collect identity data).
302. See DAVID A. HOLLINGER, POSTETHNIC AMERICA 179–82 (2006) (proposing
similar amendments to the census in the context of racial identity); Sudeall, supra
note 63, at 1296.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-2\TWL206.txt

322

unknown

Seq: 56

10-MAR-22

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

14:18

[Vol. 9

those various purposes. They could ask questions that seek information about ascriptive identity, self-identification, ancestry, or prior
self-identifications, depending on the purposes for which the data is
being used.
Thus, data-collection laws’ exclusive reliance on self-identification
reflects a context-detached approach. Self-identification is not always
the best measure of identity because it doesn’t always align with the
identity they are generally ascribed by others. Other types of identity
evidence may also conflict with their self-identification—someone’s
“biological” sex might not match their self-identification or their ascriptive sex, or someone’s ancestry may not influence their racial selfidentification or their ascriptive race. These various forms of identity
evidence may be more or less useful depending on why the identity
data is being collected.
B. Anti-Discrimination Laws
This Section argues that courts adopt a context-detached approach
to identity adjudication when they focus on determining the “actual”
identity of the plaintiff. Determining a plaintiff’s “actual” identity is
not relevant under black letter anti-discrimination law or the two prevailing theories of anti-discrimination law (anti-classification and antisubordination). Rather, this Section argues that the focus of analysis
should be the content of the discrimination and the perspective of the
discriminator. First, I argue that neither black letter anti-discrimination law nor the two prevailing normative theories of anti-discrimination law call for courts to determine “actual” identity. Then, I turn to
the harms of context-detached identity adjudication and show how
this approach can violate privacy interests and needlessly reinforce
problematic stereotypes about certain identities.
1. Identity Adjudication and Black Letter Law
Determining a plaintiff’s “actual” identity is not required under the
anti-discrimination laws discussed in this Article for a fairly straightforward reason—Title VII, and similar state laws, are symmetrical,
meaning that they protect all races, religions, sexes, etc., not just one
sex or one race.303 So regardless of whether someone is Black or
white, Muslim or Christian, or male or female, they are still protected
under Title VII because they have a race, sex, or religious identity. If
Title VII were asymmetrical, like the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), which only applies to people over 40,304 determining the plaintiff’s true identity (age in this case) might be
303. For a fuller discussion regarding the distinction between symmetrical and
asymmetrical laws, see Naomi Schoenbaum, The Case for Symmetry in Antidiscrimination Law, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 69, 69 (2017) [hereinafter Case for Symmetry].
304. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a).
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necessary. But Title VII and similar state laws apply to everyone, regardless of their specific identity. Nevertheless, some courts mistakenly construe anti-discrimination case law and statutes to require a
determination of the plaintiff’s identity. The following discussion sets
forth different doctrinal rationales courts offer to justify their reliance
on “actual” identity and then explains why they are flawed.
First, Title VII prohibits discrimination “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” and some courts
interpret this language to require a determination of the individual’s
identity.305 But this language does not mean that the court needs to
figure out if a plaintiff is Black or white, Muslim or Christian, or male
or female. Rather, this language indicates that Title VII protects certain identity categories and is focused on the treatment of individuals,
not groups. It does not require courts to engage in identity factfinding.306
Another frequent justification is the first prong of the McDonell
Douglas framework for analyzing disparate treatment cases—namely
that the plaintiff must be a member in a protected class or group.307 In
the McDonell Douglas case itself, this meant that the plaintiff needed
to show “that he belongs to a racial minority.”308 But in setting forth
this framework, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that this framework was not required in all disparate treatment cases and that Title
VII protected all members of identities categories.309 Lower courts
therefore misapply Supreme Court precedent when they construe this
prong “as an absolute bar against misperception discrimination
claims.”310 Moreover, this interpretation of McDonell Douglas conflicts with the symmetrical nature of Title VII.
Some courts that dismiss misperception cases base their reasoning
on the fact that another anti-discrimination statute—namely, the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)—protects individuals “re305. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (emphasis added).
306. Moreover, as Jessica Clarke argues, in cases where the discrimination is based
on a misperceived identity, such discriminatory behavior generally still flows from
“some protected trait of the plaintiff, such as skin color, or stereotypes about that
trait” and is “generally inextricable from those plaintiffs’ own racial, sexual, or other
protected identities.” Protected Class, supra note 27, at, 113. For example, when a
plaintiff is discriminated against based on the mistaken belief that she is Black, that
discrimination is usually based on her skin color or some other racially correlated
trait. The statutory language, therefore, does not require a determination of the plaintiff’s actual identity.
307. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (holding that
the plaintiff, who identified himself as Black, established the initial element of a prima
facie case of intentional race discrimination by demonstrating that he belonged to a
“racial minority” group).
308. Id. at 802.
309. Id. at 802 n.13.
310. For other scholars who have made similar points, see Greene, supra note 17, at
119–120; see also Protected Class, supra note 27, at 117–19; Eisenstadt, supra note 27,
at 807–08; Judicial Erasure, supra note 27, at 548.
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garded as” disabled, not just disabled individuals.311 Under this reasoning, because Title VII does not include the “regarded as” language,
Title VII does not protect individuals who are “regarded as” (or misperceived as) a particular identity.312 But unlike the anti-discrimination laws discussed in this Article, the ADA is asymmetrical, i.e., it is
focused on remedying discrimination against individuals with disabilities—not able-bodied people.313 The ADA therefore needs to include
the “regarded as” language to protect people perceived to have a disability even if they do not actually have that disability.314 This is not
true for Title VII and related laws because they are symmetrical and
protect all races, religions, etc. Thus, including the “regarded as” language in Title VII would be redundant and unnecessary.315
The inconsistency with which courts interrogate identity in discrimination cases only further shows that anti-discrimination law does not
require identity adjudication. As the previous Section demonstrated,
there is inconsistency both within and between identity categories.
Some courts impose actuality requirements in race discrimination
cases, while others do not;316 same story for religious discrimination
claims.317 Moreover, courts rarely, if ever, throw out sexual orientation discrimination claims based on the plaintiff’s actual sexual orientation but are much more likely to do so for race discrimination
claims.318
Courts are coming to these inconsistent conclusions even though
neither Title VII nor corresponding state laws allow courts to use different tests for different identity categories. In other words, the same
anti-discrimination statutes cannot allow misperception claims in the
context of religion and then reject them in the context of race—and
311. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (“The Congress finds that . . . many people with
physical or mental disabilities have been precluded from [fully participating in all aspects of society] because of discrimination; other who have a record of a disability or
are regarded as having a disability also have been subjected to discrimination . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
312. Butler v. Potter, 345 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (“Congress has
shown, through . . . the Americans with Disabilities Act, that it knows how to enact
legislation that protects persons who are wrongly perceived to be in a protected
class.”).
313. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (“It is the purpose of the chapter to provide a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.”).
314. See Protected Class, supra note 27, at 115–16 (making the same point).
315. See id. (arguing that the addition of “regarded as” to Title VII is not only
unnecessary but also would be a bad idea); see also Greene, supra note 17, at 153–162
(presenting a survey of cases and EEOC directives to show that rather than adding
“regarded as” language to Title VII, “all individuals alleging categorical discrimination on the basis of Title VII’s proscribed characteristics are already entitled to statutory protection and have standing to maintain a claim of discrimination regardless of
whether their identity was correctly perceived”).
316. See discussion supra Part III(B)(3).
317. See discussion supra Part III(B)(2).
318. See discussion supra Parts III(B)(1), III(B)(3).

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-2\TWL206.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 59

ADJUDICATING IDENTITY

10-MAR-22

14:18

325

the same statute cannot require a determination of a plaintiff’s “actual” identity in sex discrimination cases and then not require such a
determination in sexual orientation discrimination cases.319
To be sure, identity is relevant to an anti-discrimination claim. The
discriminatory conduct must be connected to a protected identity category to fall under Title VII and related laws. But courts can conduct
this inquiry under the causation prong of its analysis rather than interrogating the plaintiff’s identity.320 In other words, instead of asking
what a plaintiff’s identity is, they should ask what the cause of the
discrimination was—rather than ask whether the plaintiff is Hispanic,
gay, Muslim, etc., ask whether the alleged discriminatory conduct was
motived by race, sex, religion, etc.321 To answer this causation question, courts can and should focus on how the discriminators understood or perceived the plaintiffs’ identities and their motivations
behind the discrimination.322
Taking all of this together, identity adjudication is not doctrinally
necessary. The viability of a racial discrimination claim does not depend on the “true” racial identity of the plaintiff. Determining a plaintiff’s “actual” identity is not doctrinally necessary for sex
discrimination cases either. Recall that the cases discussed in Part III
used plaintiffs’ biological traits to determine their “actual” sex,323 but
determining a plaintiff’s “actual” sex, using a plaintiff’s biological
traits or otherwise, is not necessary to adjudicate sex discrimination
claims. Said differently, courts do not need to know the makeup of
plaintiffs’ internal and external reproductive organs, the composition
of their chromosomes, the sex that they were assigned at birth, or any
other sensitive biological information to adjudicate a sex discrimination claim. Rather, just like with other identities, the relevant inquiry
is the discriminator’s perception of the plaintiff’s sex identity.
Consider Ann Hopkins, the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse. The discrimination Hopkins faced was based on the fact that her perceived
sex (not her “actual” sex) did not align with how her employer expected people of that identity to perform their identity.324 Her em319. Identity interrogation is also not necessary under other anti-discrimination
laws addressed here. Section 1981 is symmetrical and applies to all persons regardless
of their actual races. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 286–87
(1976) (holding that § 1981 applies to all persons, including white people). State level
anti-discrimination laws are generally modeled after federal laws, so the arguments
from Title VII and § 1981 also applies to those laws. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§§ 710–711 (2021); WIS. STAT. § 111.32 (2021).
320. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
321. Naomi Schoenbaum has also argued that by considering identity in the causation prong, the court’s analysis focuses on the conduct of the discriminator, as opposed to the identity of the plaintiff. Case for Symmetry, supra note 303, at 138–40.
322. For more on why this approach would benefit multiracial plaintiffs in particular, see Judicial Erasure, supra note 27, at 547–50.
323. See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984).
324. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234–35 (1989).
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ployer perceived her to be a woman and did not think women should
be masculine, competitive, or aggressive.325 Nothing about Hopkins’
case or the Court’s reasoning would change if Hopkins had a penis or
XY chromosomes, as long as her discriminators did not know about
these biological traits and/or they did not affect the discriminators’
perception of her sex.326 The relevant inquiry was not whether Hopkins had biological traits associated with a female sex identity but
which sex her employer understood her to be.
The same is true if Hopkins did have penis or XY chromosomes,
and her employer fired her when he found out about these biological
traits. If her employer understood her sex to be male (because of
these biological traits), she could win under a sex-stereotyping theory
of sex discrimination by arguing that the discriminatory treatment was
based on the employer’s stereotype that males are not supposed to be
feminine or identify as a woman. If her employer perceived her sex to
be female (because of her self-identification and ascriptive factors),
sex-stereotyping also applies because the discrimination stemmed
from a stereotype that females are not supposed to have penises. Either way, interrogating Hopkins’ “actual” sex is not necessary.327
In sum, courts who focus on determining the “actual” identity of
plaintiffs are engaged in context-detached identity adjudication because these particular anti-discrimination laws do not require a determination of identity in the first place.
2. Identity Adjudication and Normative Theories of AntiDiscrimination Law
In addition to not being required under black letter anti-discrimination law, interrogating plaintiffs’ identities does not serve the overall
purposes of anti-discrimination law. The purposes of anti-discrimination laws have been widely debated,328 but here, I address the two
most prominent theories: anti-classification and anti-subordination.329
Under the “anti-classification,” also known as “anti-differentiation,” school of thought, anti-discrimination laws are meant to protect
325. Id. at 235.
326. Katherine Franke has also argued that sex discrimination is rarely, if ever,
based on biological traits like chromosomes and that equality law should abandon its
commitment to biological definitions of sex and to a truth of sexual difference. See
Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5, 98 (1995).
327. Bostock’s holding would still stand under this conception of sex adjudication.
The only change would be in its rationale. Rather defining “sex” as the employee’s
sex assigned at birth, Bostock could have focused on how the employer perceived the
plaintiff’s sex as the starting point of analysis.
328. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1005–06 (1986).
329. Jessica Clarke argues why protected-class gatekeeping is also not justified
under two additional theories of anti-discrimination law—anti-essentialism and antibalkanization. Protected Class, supra note 27, at 145–55.
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individuals from mistreatment based on a protected category (sex,
race, religion, etc.).330 This position is focused on individual fairness
and favors prohibiting decisionmakers from considering any protected
identity category, regardless of whether that identity is privileged or
subordinated in society.331 To an anti-classificationist, it is equally
harmful to discriminate against men as it is women. Litigating the
plaintiff’s “actual” identity isn’t in line with this view because the discriminator should be punished for taking a protected category into
account no matter what the plaintiff’s “real” identity is. That is, regardless of whether an individual is discriminated against based on
their actual or perceived identity, they were still discriminated against
based on a protected identity. Thus, a discriminator violates these fairness principles of anti-discrimination law regardless of the plaintiff’s
“actual” identity and even when a discriminator is wrong about the
plaintiff’s identity.332
Anti-subordination theory also does not support identity adjudication for anti-discrimination laws. Under an anti-subordination approach, anti-discrimination law should seek to prevent “practices that
enforce the secondary social status of historically oppressed
groups.”333 Unlike anti-classification theory, which views the harms of
discrimination on an individual level, anti-subordination theory focuses on systemically disadvantaged groups. Under this view, discriminatory practices may harm privileged groups—straight people, white
people, men, etc.— but not in the same way that discrimination
against marginalized groups “compound[s] a pattern of stigma and
bias going back generations and reaching across domains of social
life.”334 An anti-subordination theorist might be in favor of different
liability standards for claims challenging anti-Black, anti-woman, or
anti-queer discrimination compared to claims alleging anti-white, antimale, or anti-heterosexual discrimination. It may seem that under this
theory, adjudicating the plaintiff’s identity is necessary to determine
which legal standard should apply.
330. Colker, supra note 328, at 1005.
331. See Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination Law, 63 ALA. L. REV. 955, 994–95 (2012); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 457–58 (1975); McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S.
352, 358 (1995).
332. Craig Robert Senn, Perception over Reality: Extending the ADA’s Concept of
“Regarded As” Protection Under Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 36 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 827, 856 (2009) (arguing that “ ‘erroneous discriminators’ are—to be
blunt—still discriminators”).
333. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIA. L. REV. 9, 9 (2003). For some additional accounts of anti-subordination theory, see DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and
the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 107, 108, 157 (1976).
334. Protected Class, supra note 27, at 156.
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However, this position misses the distinction between interrogating
a plaintiff’s identity and what qualifies as illegal discrimination.335 Adjudicating whether the plaintiff is white or Black, gay or straight, etc.
is a separate question from whether anti-white discrimination should
be cognizable under anti-discrimination law or litigated under the
same standards as discrimination against racial minorities. Said differently, discrimination claims that attack anti-Black racist structures in
the workplace support an anti-subordination theory of anti-discrimination law regardless of the identity of the plaintiff who brings those
claims. Under anti-subordination theory, “those harmed by discriminatory dynamics such as racism, sexism, religious intolerance, and
homophobia should have recourse to the law, whatever their
identities.”336
Another reason interrogating plaintiffs’ identities does not serve
anti-subordination goals is exposed through the multi-identity lens of
this Article. As discussed, race discrimination claims are more likely
to be dismissed based on the identity of the plaintiff than other types
of discrimination claims. This applies to discrimination cases that further anti-subordination goals—i.e., cases attacking racial hierarchies—
not only cases of “reverse” discrimination. On the other hand, in the
sexual orientation context, discrimination cases that further anti-subordination purposes—i.e., cases disrupting heteronormativity and
homophobia—are generally not dismissed based on the plaintiff’s
identity. So while both straight and non-straight plaintiffs are permitted to bring claims based on anti-gay harassment, in some cases, only
plaintiffs of a particular race can bring claims based on racial subordination. This result is not in line with anti-subordination goals, particularly considering that the origins of the principle are rooted in
addressing racial subordination.337
Shifting the focus away from adjudicating a plaintiff’s “actual” identity allows courts to direct their attention to the discriminatory conduct the plaintiff encountered. Dismissing cases based on the
plaintiff’s identity, and/or determining whether a plaintiff’s identity
claim meets some court-adopted “objective” standard is not supported by either the black letter law of anti-discrimination law or the
two dominant theories of anti-discrimination law.

335. Jessica Clarke makes this argument when explaining why protected class inquiries are not required by an anti-subordination approach to anti-discrimination law.
See id. at 158.
336. Id. (emphasis added); see also Case for Symmetry, supra note 303, at 86–98
(arguing that a symmetrical approach to anti-discrimination laws serves anti-subordination goals).
337. See Fiss, supra note 315, at 157.
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3. Problems Caused by Context-Detached Adjudication
The problems with context-detached identity adjudication have
been raised throughout this Article, but I put a point on them here.
First, courts who adopt a context-detached approach and focus on determining a plaintiff’s “real” identity create inconsistency in the case
law. Currently, the success or failure of plaintiffs’ misperception
claims does—but should not—depend on the particular judge assigned to the case or the identity category involved. This approach can
also produce results that are at odds with the purpose of these antidiscrimination laws. Title VII and related statutes are intended to provide a remedy to people who were mistreated based on a protected
category regardless of their “real” identity. So when plaintiffs lose
claims in whole or in part based on their “real” identity, these laws are
not being implemented to fidelity.
Additionally, when legal actors try to determine a plaintiff’s “actual” identity, they are relying on more identity evidence than necessary to adjudicate the identity—that is, they are over-interrogating
identity. I fully explore the consequences of over-interrogation in
other work,338 but I summarize two primary harms here. One, making
identity claims dependent on unnecessary identity evidence may infringe upon plaintiffs’ privacy. As other scholars have explained, individuals have legally protected privacy interests in their identities and
should be able to exercise control over how, when, and to whom various aspects of their identities are disclosed.339 So when courts examine
things like the make-up of someone’s chromosomes,340 ancestral background,341 and blood quantum,342 when the law doesn’t require them
to do so, they may be impinging on plaintiffs’ privacy. To be sure, the
plaintiffs themselves disclosed this identity information to the court in
the first instance, but the court then rebroadcast that information in
publicly available court opinions. Moreover, if courts made clear that
the identity inquiry was not about determining plaintiffs’ “real” identities, plaintiffs would probably not reveal this information, or at least
not as much of it, to the court in the first place. By relying on this
information to determine “actual” identity and treating “actual” identity as important to the success of plaintiffs’ claims, courts are encouraging disclosure.
338. See Working Manuscript, supra note 24.
339. See Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159, 161–62
(2015) (arguing that information about someone’s sexuality, sex, and related health
and medical information have heightened constitutional importance under the Due
Process Clause); Elective Race, supra note 61, at 1505–07 (arguing that individuals
have a legally recognized interest in exercising control over the terms of disclosing
their racial identity).
340. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
341. See Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 172–73 (3d Cir. 1991).
342. See Leonard v. Katsinas, No. 05-1069, 2007 WL 1106136, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Apr.
11, 2007).
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The other harm from over-interrogation involves the power of the
law unnecessarily reifying the essential characteristics of an identity
and reinforcing stereotypes about that identity.343 For example, when
the Bennun v. Rutgers State University court found that the plaintiff
was Hispanic based on his appearance, speech, cultural affiliation with
“Spanish life,” and ability to speak Spanish, the court was suggesting
that some of these things (all of these things?) are definitional qualities of being “Hispanic.”344 In turn, the court reinforced stereotypes
about what it means to be a “real” Hispanic (someone who speaks,
dresses, and looks a certain way).
Additionally, courts’ reliance on “actual” sex in sex discrimination
cases, and determination of “actual” sex based on biological characteristics, supports the dominant discourse that sex has innate, fixed,
physical components. First, as previously argued, there is no legal
need to adopt any definition of “actual” sex in this context.345 Moreover, defining “actual” sex as sex assigned at birth, chromosomes, sex
characteristics, or other biological identity evidence supports a model
of sex that does not align with many people’s lived experiences and
can cause a myriad of harms, including: promoting nonconsensual surgery on babies born with genitals that are not clearly a penis or a
vagina,346 rendering invisible nonbinary individuals who do not subscribe to binary models of sex,347 and stigmatizing and pathologizing
transgender people,348 to name a few.
To a certain extent, all identity adjudication runs the risk of essentializing identity—when legal actors determine whether someone is a
particular race, sex, etc., whatever identity evidence is dispositive of
that determination becomes linked to that identity. But as long as the
identity inquiry is tied to the function of the law, no one type of identity evidence will ever be determinative of identity across all legal con343. See FORD, supra note 33, at 78 (arguing that when legal actors make certain
traits or characteristics essential to identity, they may “underwrite destructive selfimages and misguided commitments with the force of law and the intractability of
precedents”).
344. See Bennun, 941 F.2d at 172–73 (finding that the plaintiff was Hispanic due to
his “birth in a Latin American country where Hispanic culture predominates, his immersion in Spanish ways of life, and the fact that he speaks Spanish in the home,” as
well as his “appearance, speech and mannerism” and other traits that indicate his
“objective appearance to others”). In other words, the court is giving “Hispanic” a
“substantive, cultural content [that] is a way of freezing the definition of that identity
in place and time, or declaring that it contains universal characteristics, or certain
parameters within which anyone who truly belongs must fall.” Cristina M. Rodrı́guez,
Against Individualized Consideration, 83 IND. L.J. 1405, 1412 (2008).
345. See supra Part III(C)(4).
346. See, e.g., Chinyere Ezie, Deconstructing the Body: Transgender and Intersex
Identities and Sex Discrimination—the Need for Strict Scrutiny, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 141, 150–51 (2011).
347. See, e.g., Spade, supra note 30, at 322.
348. See, e.g., Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 25–26 (2003).
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texts. Rather, identity definitions will be flexible and context-specific.
For instance, some laws may require biological evidence to determine
sex, but other times, ascriptive evidence or self-identification may be
more appropriate. This way, no single trait becomes an essential element of sex.
C. Benefit Laws
Legal actors also, at times, engage in context-detached identity adjudication with benefit laws, and, in turn, examine the wrong kind of
evidence to achieve the purpose of the law. Just like the analysis of
anti-discrimination laws did not take a position on what the goal, purpose, or function of anti-discrimination law should be, this analysis
also does not tackle what the purpose of a particular law should be;
that is beyond this Article’s scope. The proper normative function of
any one of these laws could be and is the topic of entire law review
articles. Rather, this Section uses the function of the law as stated in
the case law, statutes, regulations, lawmakers, or other primary
sources. This Section provides examples of context-detached adjudication and shows how, in many instances, the purpose or function of
these laws can be served with a less strict, or different, standard for
identity claims.
1. Sex
Recall that many states require people to have some sort of surgical
procedure to change the sex marker on their birth certificate.349 Mandating invasive and expensive surgery is burdensome and arguably
more taxing than any other form of identity proof discussed in this
Article.350 These requirements do not align with the underlying goals
of these laws. Here’s why.
States’ interests in regulating sex markers on identity documents are
generally not made explicit in the governing statutes or regulations,
but some courts, agencies, and legislators have cited (1) the regulation
of sex-segregated spaces and (2) concerns about fraud as potential
349. LAMBDA LEGAL, supra note 252.
350. Vaginoplasty, for example, is a six hour surgery with a recovery time of up to
18 months. Erin Larowe, What to Expect: Vaginoplasty at the University of Michigan
Health System, U. MICH. HEALTH SYS., http://www.med.umich.edu/pdf/Vaginoplasty.pdf (Dec. 2016) [https://perma.cc/ZPW5-YS5V]. Phalloplasty can take as
long as eight hours with a similar recovery time. What to Expect: Phalloplasty at Michigan Medicine, MICH. MED., http://www.med.umich.edu/1libr/Surgery/PlasticSurgery/
GenderConfirmationSurgery/Phalloplasty.pdf (Apr. 2019) [https://perma.cc/3GXW4LX2]. Chest masculinization surgery, or “bilateral mastectomy,” typically takes 3 to
5 hours to perform, and patients recover over a period of 6 to 12 months. Ctr. for
Transgender Health, FAQ: Chest Masculinization, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., https://
www.hopkinsmedicine.org/center-transgender-health/services-appointments/faq/topsurgery [https://perma.cc/6F3L-M8EW].
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state interests.351 But neither of these interests support such an onerous proof requirement for a sex identity claim. First, any interest the
state has in ensuring that sex-segregated spaces (bathrooms, locker
rooms, etc.) only include people of the same sex does not support the
surgical requirement for sex marker changes. When made, this argument is generally tied to a privacy or safety interest—i.e., people (and
cisgender women in particular) will not be safe and/or will have their
privacy interests violated in the restroom if people of another sex are
permitted to enter that space.352 One obvious reason that requiring
surgery to change sex markers on identity documents does not support this interest is because these identity documents are usually not
required to access sex-segregated spaces.353
But putting that aside, safety and privacy concerns do not support
the burdensome identity proof standard for sex marker changes. First,
there is little to no empirical evidence suggesting that allowing transgender people access to sex-segregated spaces raises safety concerns
for cisgender people.354 In fact, transgender individuals are more
likely to experience—not commit—violence in the restroom than cisgender individuals.355
Moreover, it is unclear how requiring surgery to change a sex
marker helps ensure privacy or safety. As for the safety concern, requiring surgery suggests that someone who has had sex-reassignment
351. See, e.g., Mottet, supra note 246, at 413–20; see also supra notes 247–48 and
accompanying text.
352. See, e.g., Gwen Aviles, Kentucky Bill Would Let Students Sue Over Transgender Bathroom Use, NBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2019, 1:21 PM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/kentucky-bill-would-let-students-sue-over-transgender-bathroom-use-n1101651 [perma.cc/76E6-8KSU] (describing a bill in Kentucky
regarding bathroom use stating that “[c]hildren and young adults have natural and
normal concerns about privacy while in various states of undress, and most wish for
members of the opposite biological sex not to be present in those circumstances”);
Aamer Madhani, Battle Brewing Over Transgender Bathroom Laws in State Capitals,
USA TODAY, https://www.wkyc.com/article/news/battle-brewing-over-transgenderbathroom-laws-in-state-capitals/57900588 (Feb. 27, 2016, 9:14 AM) [https://perma.cc/
3F38-8T7F] (finding that opponents of a nondiscrimination bill in Houston argued
that transgender women are sexually perverse men who would use the ordinance to
enter the women’s restrooms and prey on wives, mothers, and daughters).
353. Mottet, supra note 246, at 419.
354. See, e.g., Carlos Maza & Luke Brinker, 15 Experts Debunk Right-Wing Transgender Bathroom Myth, MEDIA MATTERS (Mar. 19, 2014, 4:06 PM), https://
www.mediamatters.org/sexual-harassment-sexual-assault/15-experts-debunk-rightwing-transgender-bathroom-myth [https://perma.cc/UFT9-G97S] (compiling reports
from law enforcement officials, government employees, and advocates for victims of
sexual assault from 12 states and concluding that concerns about violence have no
factual basis).
355. See Katy Steinmetz, Why LGBT Advocates Say Bathroom ‘Predators’ Argument Is a Red Herring, TIMES (May 2, 2016, 4:29 PM), https://time.com/4314896/transgender-bathroom-bill-male-predators-argument/ [https://perma.cc/L87D-HSNB].
SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL, THE REPORT OF
THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 226–27 (2016), https://transequality.org/sites/
default/files/docs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf [perma.cc/7S34-VLUX].
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surgery is less prone to violent behavior than someone who has not
had sex-reassignment surgery. But a self-identified woman with a vagina is not less likely to harm someone than a self-identified woman
with a penis.356 There is simply no evidence indicating that pre-operative transgender people pose a greater safety risk than post-operative
transgender people or cisgender people.357
As for the privacy concern, some have asserted that cisgender individuals’ privacy interests are violated when transgender individuals
with different genitals or secondary sex characteristics enter a sex-segregated space.358 But as Professor Susan Hazeldean has convincingly
argued, none of the six primary theoretical justifications for privacy
rights support this claimed privacy violation.359 Instead, she shows
how it is transgender individuals’ privacy rights that are at stake when
they are excluded from sex-segregated spaces.360
Even assuming cisgender individuals’ privacy interests are legitimate, these interests do not require transgender people to have surgery to access a sex-segregated space. Many sex-segregated spaces
(like bathrooms and dressing rooms) provide ample privacy options
such that individuals do not have to expose their body or view anyone
else’s body. For other spaces, like locker rooms—where privacy may
be harder, but usually not impossible, to come by—the privacy interest can be addressed by adding additional private spaces, which is
something that most people generally desire.361 Additionally, by requiring surgery, the law suggests that an individual’s subjective feelings of discomfort when a woman with a penis sees their exposed body
(compared to their discomfort when a woman with a vagina sees them
naked), is so great that the law should require people to have expensive and evasive surgery. Privacy or safety concerns, therefore, cannot
justify such high standards for sex marker change laws.
A second interest often invoked in this context is fraud prevention,
or the concern that people will fraudulently change their sex markers
356. See generally Maza & Brinker, supra note 354 (suggesting that because allowing transgender people access to sex-segregated spaces has not resulted in increased crimes, a transgender person is not more likely to commit a crime than a
cisgender person).
357. Id.
358. See, e.g., Wolf Continues Its Fight for Girls’ Privacy and Safety in Boyertown,
WOMEN’S LIBERATION FRONT (Jul. 12, 2018), https://www.womensliberationfront.org/
news/wolf-continues-its-fight-for-girls-privacy-and-safety-in-boyertown?rq=birth
%20certificate [https://perma.cc/W7MU-UNR5] (statement of Lierre Keith) (“A
male person cannot become female. Male people who wish to enter the intimate
spaces that are reserved for female people are invading women’s spaces, which violates the human rights of women and girls.”).
359. Susan Hazeldean, Privacy as Pretext, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1719, 1769–70
(2019).
360. Id. at 1770; see also Ruth Colker, Public Restrooms: Flipping the Default Rules,
78 OHIO ST. L. J. 145, 171–76 (2017) (debunking the privacy and safety justifications
for sex-segregated bathrooms).
361. Clarke, supra note 28, at 982–83.
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to avoid law enforcement or creditors or to engage in some other bad
act.362 But the extent to which changing a sex marker helps someone
commit fraud is questionable. Changing other information—like
name, address, financial institution, and hair color—is more helpful in
facilitating fraud than changing a sex marker.363 Yet changing this information is comparatively much easier than changing a sex marker.
Moreover, making it difficult to change sex markers on identity documents can ring false alarms for fraud and divert law enforcement attention away from legitimate fraud. For instance, consider a person
who ascriptively appeared to be a woman to most observers. The picture on her license is updated and matches her current appearance,
but her sex marker still reads “M” because she did not meet the law’s
surgical requirements. Because of this mismatch between her appearance and her sex marker, she is subjected to extra security screenings
at airports, additional barriers when applying for loans, and increased
scrutiny when purchasing items that require proof of identification.
Resources are spent chasing down suspected fraud because her sex
marker raises red flags.364
There is no empirical evidence that less onerous standards to
change sex markers are correlated with an increase in fraud.365 But
even assuming that the fraud concerns were legitimate, requiring invasive medical procedures to change a sex marker would still be too high
of a burden. An individual seeking to commit fraud by changing their
birth certificate can be deterred through less rigorous standards—like
a statement from a doctor or other professional attesting to the veracity of their desire to change sex markers.
Some scholars have convincingly argued that the government does
not have any legitimate interest in regulating sex markers on birth
certificates and that sex markers should be eliminated on birth certificates.366 But even assuming arguendo that there is some reason the
state needs to have sex markers on birth certificates in the first place,
or needs to erect any barriers to changing them, requiring biological
evidence of sex, usually in the form of surgery, does not align with the
362. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, Sex and the City: New York City Bungles Transgender
Equality, SLATE (Dec. 11, 2006, 2:43 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2006/12/
new-york-city-bungles-transgender-equality.html [https://perma.cc/F8BY-W752]
(describing the concern that “[l]owering the barriers to sex reassignment increases the
incentive for individuals who have no sincere desire to change their sex to do so for
opportunistic reasons.”); Clarke, supra note 28, at 947–48 (discussing this concern and
other concerns in the context of non-binary gender).
363. DAVIS, supra note 48, at 51 (arguing that sex-identity markers are “poor proxies for personal identification” and that governments should use other techniques,
such as biometrics, instead).
364. See id. at 2–3.
365. See Yoshino, supra note 362 (discussing the unlikeliness of sex fraud).
366. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 48, at 51 (“[R]elevant [government] agencies
[should] remove sex markers from the identity documents they issue.”).
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purported functions of these laws (even assuming these functions are
legitimate).
Turning to sex-segregated sports, both the former NCAA rule (the
focus of which on testosterone levels is likely to be perpetuated
through its new sport-specific approach) and the Idaho law determine
sex in ways that fail to align with their stated purposes, though the
latter much more so than the former. As for the NCAA rule, before
the rule change in January 2022, the self-proclaimed purpose behind
the policy was to ensure that no one has an unfair advantage in women’s sports due to high testosterone levels.367 However, the way the
NCAA adjudicates sex (requiring trans women to be on testosterone
blockers for one year368) does not necessarily align with this purpose.
To be sure, there is evidence linking higher testosterone levels to increased muscle mass, strength, and other traits that can give athletes
in certain sports a competitive advantage.369 However, if testosterone
levels produce an unfair advantage, why only regulate the testosterone of transgender women? Cisgender women could have higher
levels of testosterone than a transgender woman on testosterone
blockers.370 In this way, the NCAA’s former policy, and NGBs that
have adopted, or will adopt, a similar rule, are context-detached because they fail to account for testosterone in cisgender women. Rather
than ensuring people who compete in women’s sports have similar
levels of testosterone, this policy singles out transgender people and
their bodies as objects of regulation.
The purported purposes of Idaho’s law are similar to the fairnessbased goal of the NCAA rule—namely, “promoting sex equality, providing opportunities for female athletes to demonstrate their skill,
strength, and athletic abilities, and by providing female athletes with
opportunities to obtain college scholarship and other accolades.”371
However, the Act’s approach to determining who is “female” for sexsegregated sports has very little to do with these purposes.372 As discussed, the Act relies on “reproductive anatomy,” chromosomes, and
naturally occurring hormone levels. Yet these traits do not affect athletic performance. That is, whether a student was born with a vagina
or a penis, or XY or XX chromosomes, in and of themselves, have
nothing to do with that student’s athletic capabilities. Because these
traits do not affect students’ bodies in ways that could improve their
physical capabilities, using them to determine “sex” does nothing to
367. See GRIFFIN & CARROLL, supra note 263, at 10, 13.
368. Id. at 13.
369. See Hecox v. Little, 479 F. Supp. 3d 930, 982 (D. Idaho 2020).
370. See David J. Handelsman, Angelica L. Hirschberg & Stephane Bermon, Circulating Testosterone as the Hormonal Basis of Sex Differences in Athletic Performance,
39 ENDOCRINE REVS. 803, 807 (2018) (showing varying levels of testosterone in cisgender women).
371. IDAHO CODE § 336202(12).
372. Little, 479 F. Supp. at 984.
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ensure fairness in women’s sports or promote sex equality. The fairness purpose of the Act would only arguably be advanced by something it excludes—circulating testosterone, the primary driver of
relevant physiological differences between male and female athletic
performance.373 Instead, the Act relies on endogenous testosterone,
which depending on the individual, may not reflect their current testosterone levels or their athletic capabilities. Moreover, on its face,
Act does not bar transgender men who are taking testosterone from
participating in women’s sports as long as they have not had surgery
to their genitals. In other words, a student assigned female at birth
who has testosterone levels similar to those of a cisgender man are
“biologically female” under the terms of the Act even though they
arguably have a competitive advantage over cisgender women in some
contexts.
In these ways, and in others,374 the Act’s definition of “sex” is completely context-detached because it fails to advance any of the Act’s
purported purposes. In its decision enjoining the Act, the district court
relied on the complete lack of fit between the Act’s stated goals and
the means used to achieve those goals when holding that the Act
likely violated the Equal Protection Clause.375 Due to this gross lack
of fit between the Act’s stated goals and its means of achieving those
goals, the district court held that the purported purposes of the Act
were not the Act’s actual goal; rather, it held that the Act’s actual goal
is to “exclude[e] transgender women and girls from women’s sports
entirely, regardless of their physiological characteristics.” The Act’s
definition of sex is not context-detached at all if transgender exclusion
is its purpose; rather, it effectively serves its goal.376
373. See id. at 984 (“[T]he Act’s definition of ‘biological sex’ intentionally excludes
the one factor that a consensus of the medical community appears to agree drives the
physiological differences between male and female athletic performance.”).
374. For instance, the Act also fails to make any distinctions based on age, skill
level, or sport. All three of these factors affect whether sex distinctions are relevant or
ensure fairness for women’s sports. For instance, sex distinctions are not related to
athletic performance until puberty; yet the Act applies to youth sports. Id. at 979
(“[B]efore puberty, boys and girls have the same levels of circulating testosterone.”).
Additionally, sex distinctions (post-puberty) might make a difference in sports like
basketball or soccer, but for sports like long-distance running and swimming or golf,
there is evidence that testosterone levels do not necessarily produce a competitive
advantage. See Nancy Leong, Against Women’s Sports, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1275–76 (2018) (compiling evidence that for many sports, sex-segregation is not justified and that testosterone levels do not give people a competitive advantage).
375. Little, 479 F. Supp. 3d at 979–84 (“That the Act essentially bars consideration
of circulating testosterone illustrates the Legislature appeared less concerned with ensuring equality in athletics than it was with ensuring exclusion of transgender women
athletes.”).
376. In my future work, I expand on how context-detached identity determinations
can reveal the actual purpose of a particular law, like how the context-detached nature of the Act led the district court to conclude that the Act’s stated goals were not
its actual goals.
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2. Sexual Orientation
Context-detached adjudication of identity also occurs with sexual
orientation and asylum. The function of asylum and similar forms of
immigration relief is to determine whether a petitioner will be persecuted if forced to return to their home country and, for our purposes,
whether that persecution is motivated by sexual orientation.377 Accordingly, what people in the petitioner’s home country know or think
about the petitioner’s sexuality, or will know or think about the petitioner’s sexuality if they return, is crucial to this question of future
persecution.378 If those likely to persecute the petitioner think the petitioner is not straight, the petitioner will probably be persecuted.
But sometimes, this persecution-prevention purpose is not guiding
the identity inquiry. As discussed, some adjudicators reject nonstraight identity claims when petitioners have a history of different-sex
relationships or lack a history of same-sex relationships; however, requiring alignment between petitioners’ current self-identification and
past sexual practices does not adequately take into account the goals
of asylum for at least three reasons. First, sexuality is not rigid and
stagnant; rather, it changes depending on context and over time.379 So
a petitioner’s prior different-sex relationships do not necessarily shield
her from future persecution because her sexuality could have
changed. Second, being in a different-sex relationship does not mean
that someone identifies as heterosexual. Bisexual and queer people
are often in different-sex relationships and can still be persecuted
based on their non-straight orientation. Third, because these petitioners come from countries where not being straight is, at best, socially
stigmatized and, at worst, criminalized,380 it is reasonable, and perhaps
expected, that these petitioners would have been in different-sex relationships. For this same reason, petitioners often have difficultly solic377. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see also Cruz v. Sessions, 853 F.3d 122, 127 (4th Cir.
2017).
378. In this way, these laws mirror anti-discrimination laws in the sense that with
both laws, the crucial identity question is how people’s identities will be perceived by
their discriminators/persecutors. However, unlike with anti-discrimination laws,
where I argued that the “actual” identity of the plaintiff is irrelevant, the petitioner’s
sexual orientation may be relevant. Anti-discrimination law looks backward in time to
adjudicate prior discriminatory conduct, but asylum law is forward-looking because it
attempts to predict how the petitioner will be treated. If a petitioner is, in fact, not
straight, they are likely to be persecuted in the future based on their non-straight
identity. Thus, the petitioner’s actual identity is strong evidence of how they are likely
to be perceived in their home country.
379. See Christine E. Kaestle, Sexual Orientation Trajectories Based on Sexual Attractions, Partners, and Identity: A Longitudinal Investigation from Adolescence
Through Young Adulthood Using a U.S. Representative Sample, 56 J. SEX RSCH. 811,
812 (2019) (describing fluidity of sexual orientation).
380. See IRAN ISLAMIC PENAL CODE arts. 233–40 (criminalizing same-sex relations,
punishable by a range of various sentences ranging from flogging to the death penalty); TUNISIA PENAL CODE, art. 230 (“Sodomy. . . is punished by imprisonment for
three years.”).
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iting corroborating testimony from their same-sex partners in their
home country because it may subject their prior partners to
persecution.
To be sure, past sexual and romantic relationships can be probative
of whether petitioners will be persecuted based on their sexual orientation. But when petitioners have other identity evidence showing that
their sexuality is known in their country, or will be known upon their
return, allowing prior different-sex relationships to trump this evidence does not serve the purpose of the law—i.e., to prevent
persecution.
For instance, recall that in Mockeviciene, the petitioner had evidence that people in her home country thought she was a lesbian; indeed, while in her home country, the police harassed her, and her
husband beat her when he discovered her sexuality.381 In other words,
she had sufficient evidence that she would likely have been persecuted
on the basis of her sexual orientation if she returned to her home
country. Yet her claim for relief was denied because she had been
previously married to a man and not had a same-sex partner.382 Thus,
the court failed to adjudicate her sexual orientation in a context-informed manner, guided by the persecution-preventing purpose of
asylum.
The court’s error was even worse in Fuller—where the court rejected the petitioner’s claim to bisexuality because he was married to a
woman, had kids with a woman, and was convicted of sexually assaulting a woman.383 Not only does this case suffer from the same contextdetached approach as Mockeviciene, it also makes it nearly impossible
for a petitioner to convince the court that they are bisexual. If Fuller,
someone who had romantic and sexual relationships with men and
women, was not bisexual to the court, who would be? The rejection of
Fuller’s bisexuality claim may reflect a view that bisexuality is not a
legitimate sexual orientation, which is a fairly common narrative, particularly as applied to men.384 Thus, Fuller’s reasoning suggests that
proving a bisexual identity may be more difficult than proving a gay or

381. Mockeviciene v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 237 F. App’x 569, 570–71 (11th Cir. 2007).
382. Id. at 574.
383. Fuller v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir. 2016).
384. See Elissa L. Sarno et al., Bisexual Men’s Experiences with Discrimination, Internalized Binegativity, and Identity Affirmation: Differences by Partner Gender, 49
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 1783, 1783–84 (2020) (discussing how bisexual individuals
are stigmatized to be attention-seeking, untrustworthy, confused about their sexual
orientation, or feigning to be trendy); Katherine M. Hertlein et al., Attitudes Toward
Bisexuality According to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 16 J. BISEXUALITY 339, 341
(2016) (noting that female bisexuality is considered more socially acceptable than
male bisexuality); Yoshino, supra note 365, at 362 (arguing that homosexuals and heterosexual share an interest in bisexual erasure).

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-2\TWL206.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 73

ADJUDICATING IDENTITY

10-MAR-22

14:18

339

lesbian identity, depending on the adjudicators’ biases against bisexual
identity.385
Not all courts adjudicating identity for asylum claims share this
problem. Indeed, in the context of both religion and sexual orientation, some courts ask how the petitioner’s identity will be understood
in their home country.386 Thus, identity adjudication in asylum is not
consistent and appears dependent on the particular legal actors
involved.
3. Race
Race adjudication also, at times, is insufficiently attentive to the
purposes of the law at issue. The function of the laws addressed in this
section have been widely debated, discussed, and litigated. Currently,
the Supreme Court has limited the constitutionally permissible purposes of race-conscious benefit laws to (1) remedying past or present
discrimination387 and (2) promoting institutional diversity.388 For the
laws discussed in this Article, their purposes are primarily remedial, so
this analysis will therefore focus on that function.
Supreme Court precedent has greatly limited the scope of the remedial function of these laws. Under this precedent, remedying societal
discrimination at large is too broad of a function.389 Rather, the remedial focus needs to be narrower, like remedying racial exclusion from
a particular industry or job within a certain geographical area (e.g.,
the construction industry in Atlanta).390 Considering this function,
how then should eligibility for these programs be determined? In
other words, how can the law figure out who has likely been excluded
from a particular industry based on their race? One option is to ex385. This increased burden to prove sexual orientation may also apply to other sexuality categories that are less politically powerful and culturally salient than “gay” and
“lesbian,” like, for instance, asexuality. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Sexuality, 66 STAN. L. REV. 303, 306, 347–48, 374 (2014) (discussing how our legal system
assumes the existence of sexuality and how asexuality has not yet been included in
legal understandings of sexual orientation).
386. Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 726 (3d Cir. 2003).
387. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O’Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
388. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003).
389. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 502 (1989); O’Donnell
Const. Cor. v. Dist. of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
390. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 496–97 (1989) (citation omitted) (comparing the
“the ‘focused’ goal of remedying ‘wrongs worked by specific instances of racial discrimination’ ” with “the remedying of the effects of ‘societal discrimination,’ an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past” and explaining
that only the former is permissible). Moreover, remedial measures need to be supported by a “strong basis in evidence” of a racial disparity, which generally requires
that the government show a disparity between the number of eligible racial minorities
in the relevant market and the number of racial minorities in that market. See id. at
502.
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amine how the applicant may be racialized in the context of that industry. In other words, if the law’s purpose is to remedy
discriminatory treatment of Black or Hispanic applicants in a certain
industry, then eligible individuals should include those who are racialized as Black or Hispanic in that industry. They are the ones most
likely to have been excluded under the discriminatory hiring regime.
If racialization is the most accurate way to identify who has been
excluded from these industries, then adjudicators’ goals should be to
determine whether someone has been voluntarily or involuntarily
racialized in a particular way.391 Some aspects of racial adjudication in
the Malone and the Orion cases deviate from this purpose. First, in
both cases, the adjudicators examined the applicants’ physical appearances and racial phenotypes to determine whether they appeared to
be the race they claimed. And in both cases, the applicants appeared
white to the adjudicators.
To be sure, physical appearance is highly relevant to how someone
is racialized. But relying exclusively on the adjudicators’ opinions of
whether the applicants’ physical appearances matched their self-identification may be the wrong inquiry. Whether someone appears to be a
member of a particular racial group is highly dependent on the
viewer—their experiences with other racial groups, their own race,
etc.392 So the race adjudicators assign to applicants based on their
physical features may not be indicative of how these individuals are
racialized most of the time. Moreover, if the remedial purpose is focused on the context in which the discriminatory treatment has occurred, it makes more sense for individuals within that particular
context to assign race based on an applicant’s physical appearance,
rather than adjudicators who are not in that industry or job.
Another example of context-detached race adjudication comes
from Malone, when the court considered whether the Black community considered the Malone brothers to be Black.393 Here again, this
inquiry does not help elucidate how the applicant was racialized
within the industry the benefit law is targeting. Whether the Malone
brothers were racialized as Black by the group they were claiming to
be a part of (the Black community) matters less here than how they
391. This discussion evaluates race adjudication under the theory that racialization
within an industry best captures eligibility based on the remedial purpose of these
laws. See Racial Commodification and the Promise of the New Functionalism, supra
note 198, at 210 (using racialization to determine eligibility for affirmative action programs). There may be a better mechanism to determine eligibility that is also constitutionally permissible. The subsequent evaluation of whether racial adjudication is
overly onerous or not would likely change depending on the particular mechanism for
determining eligibility. The larger point this Article is making, however, remains the
same—that the identity evidence required for an identity claim should be informed by
what is needed to fulfill the function of the law.
392. See Greene, supra note 17, at 90.
393. See Malone v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 646 N.E.2d 150, 151 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
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were racialized by the potential discriminators within the job or industry who were not Black.394 In contrast, in Orion, the analysis centered
on how Taylor’s race was perceived in the proper context, i.e., the
business community.395 Thus, requiring that applicants be racialized as
the race they are claiming to be in contexts beyond the remedial focus
of the benefit law may also be overly burdensome and not in line with
the function of the law.
Another potentially problematic aspect of racial adjudication is the
assumption that prior inconsistent identifications are indicative of
fraud and then using those prior identifications to estop an identity
claim. In Malone, the brothers’ prior identification as white played a
role in their ultimate exclusion from the affirmative action program,
as did Taylor’s prior self-identification as white (before he received his
ancestry results) in Orion.396 And in United States v. New York City
Board of Education, employees’ self-identification as white on their
job applications was enough to exclude them from the settlement
funds.397
Using prior inconsistent racial identification to bar membership in a
claimed racial group does not necessarily align with the law’s function
and may exclude people the law intended to include. First, inconsistent identification does not necessarily indicate fraud. Multiracial individuals sometimes self-identify as monoracial, or identify with
different monoracial groups, depending on the timing, the context, the
form of the inquiry about their racial status, and how they think their
responses will be used.398 These same individuals may be racialized as
non-white and discriminated against on that basis; thus, in light of the
purpose of these laws, their prior identifications should not estop
them from asserting a different identity. Second, changes in self-identification may be associated with discovering new information about
one’s background, like the plaintiff in Orion.399 If someone reveals
this new information or their new self-identification to others, it could
394. Other scholars have made related points about affirmative action and the Malone case. Racial Commodification and the Promise of the New Functionalism, supra
note 198, at 208–09; see also Ford, supra note 158, at 1281–82.
395. See Orion Ins. Grp. v. Wash. State Off. of Minority & Women’s Bus. Enters.,
No. 16-5582, 2017 WL 3387344, at *2–3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 7, 2017), aff’d sub nom.
Orion Ins. Grp. v. Wash.’s Off. of Minority & Women’s Bus. Enters., 754 F. App’x 556
(9th Cir. 2018).
396. See Malone, 646 N.E.2d at 151; Orion Ins. Grp., 2017 WL 3387344, at *2.
397. United States v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 85 F. Supp. 2d 130, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
398. Elective Race, supra note 61, at 1533–35; see also Racial Commodification and
the Promise of the New Functionalism, supra note 198, at 192 (2013) (citing studies
showing that factors such as “class, history of imprisonment, and other experiences of
social marginalization can trigger multiracials to ‘choose’ to claim a minority identity”); see also Tehranian, supra note 291, at 3, 7–8 (explaining that racial identities are
not stable both because the categories themselves change and because individuals’
racial identities may change in relation to other aspects of their identity, such as their
political affiliation).
399. See Orion Ins. Grp., 2017 WL 3387344, at *2.
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affect how they are racialized. Indeed, a police officer sued for racial
discrimination based on the anti-Black workplace harassment he
faced after sharing his Ancestry.com results, which revealed he was
18% African.400 Thus, changes in racial self-identification are not necessarily indicative of fraud and do not mean that individuals should be
deemed ineligible for benefit laws.
A final common thread in both Orion and Malone that merits discussion is their use of ancestral evidence to determine eligibility for
these benefit laws. In Malone, the hearing officer affirmatively asked
the brothers to provide this evidence, and in Orion, Taylor provided it
on his own to support his racial claims. But these adjudicators did not
appear to use this ancestral evidence to determine how these applicants were racialized. Although ancestry certainly plays a role in
racialization through the inheritance of certain racialized features, like
skin color, hair color, etc., neither Malone nor Orion used ancestral
evidence as a proxy for physical appearance. In both cases, physical
appearance and racial phenotype were considered via other forms of
evidence. Ancestral evidence could also have affected these applicants’ racialization if they revealed their ancestral backgrounds and
were subsequently assigned a racial identity based on that information. But that’s not how ancestral evidence was used in these cases
either. Rather, the ancestral evidence seemed to provide these applicants with an alternative way to prove their racial claim—a path separate and apart from how they were racialized. In Malone, if the
brothers had been able to prove that their grandmother was Black,
then they might have been eligible for the affirmative action program,
regardless of how they were racialized. And in Orion, Taylor’s case
may have come out differently if he was more than 4% African. Ancestral evidence could have also been treated as an additional requirement for eligibility, that is, Taylor and the Malones would need to
have a certain percentage of African ancestry to qualify, regardless of
other identity evidence.
If the remedial purpose of these laws was permitted to be broader
and capable of addressing how the historical subordination of racial
groups across education, employment, healthcare, housing, etc., has
led to current racial disparities, ancestral evidence could be necessary
to fulfill the purpose of these laws. If the law were able to recognize
how, for example, descendants of slaves have inherited hundreds of
years of systemic disadvantage, then examining whether someone may
be a descendant of an enslaved person would be crucial. But as dis400. See Complaint at 5, Brown v. City of Hastings, No. 17-cv-0033 (W.D. Mich.
2018). The case was settled after the officer filed a complaint. Nicole Rojas, White
Police Officer Receives $65,000 Settlement from City in Racial Discrimination Suit,
NEWSWEEK (Aug. 1, 2018, 12:05 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/cleon-brown-hastings-police-michigan-racial-discrimination-settlement-1052977 [https://perma.cc/
66SN-XDDQ].
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cussed, the Supreme Court has barred broader and more historically
conscious remedial functions of benefit laws. Thus, examining ancestral evidence does not necessarily align with the purposes of these
laws.
4. Problems Caused by Context-Detached Adjudication
The harms from context-detached adjudication in benefit laws mirror those from anti-discrimination laws. First, a context-detached approach causes doctrinally inconsistent outcomes. For instance, the
identity inquiry in asylum claims is sometimes based on how the petitioner’s identity will be understood in their home country and, other
times, based on whether they “really” are the identity they claim to
be. Context-detached adjudication also produces results inconsistent
with the purpose of asylum law—asylum law is meant to protect petitioners, like Fuller and Mockeviciene, who were likely to be perceived
as not straight in their home country and persecuted on that basis.
Another example of inconsistency arises with sex adjudication—
whether someone is legally male or female for the purposes of a legal
sex designation on a birth certificate depends on the state in which
someone lives. Someone could be legally male in one state and legally
female in the next. Similarly, an athlete’s sex could be “female” under
the NCAA sport-specific rule, and “male” under Idaho’s law.
Context-detached identity adjudication also leads to over-interrogation of identity and raises concerns similar to those raised in the context of anti-discrimination laws. First, using more identity evidence
than called for to adjudicate identity can raise privacy concerns. For
example, if ancestral evidence for racial adjudication isn’t necessary
for a particular law, as suggested above, examining someone’s ancestral background, via their results from service like 23andMe or otherwise, is unnecessarily intrusive. Relatedly, dignity interests may be
threatened when a state actor conducts a visual inspection of an individual and then ascribes them a racial identity; if the relevant question
is not how a single state actor perceives someone’s race, there is no
need to risk dignity harms.401
In the context of sex, requiring invasive and expensive surgery and/
or hormone usage to change a legal sex designation on identity documents has obvious implications for people’s privacy and dignity.402
401. See Racial Commodification and the Promise of the New Functionalism, supra
note 198, at 193 (warning that census officials using third-party observations to determine a person’s race may result in “racially categorizing an individual in a way that
fundamentally contradicts the individual’s own understanding of her race”); see also
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (arguing that forcing individuals to “live under a
state-mandated racial label” is “inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society” because it assigns labels “that an individual is powerless to change”).
402. Other scholars have made similar arguments. See, e.g., Holning Lau, Gender
Recognition as a Human Right in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON NEW HUMAN
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Rules mandating hormone therapy to play sex-segregated sports in
college raise similar questions, and Idaho’s definition of “female” for
sports subjects individuals to particularly invasive inspections. When
any student on an all girl’s/women’s team has their sex challenged,
they must agree to pelvic examinations to “verify” their “reproductive
anatomy,” genetic testing to determine their chromosomes, and/or
hormone testing to remain on the team.403 This law also harms transgender students’ dignity and autonomy interests by assigning them a
sex identity that does not align with their self-identification and forcing them into spaces and activities that do not reflect their identity.404
This is not to say that privacy and dignity interests should always
outweigh the interests underlying the particular law at issue. But when
identity adjudication does not serve the interests of the underlying law
(i.e., when identity adjudication is context-detached), these interests
are being harmed for no reason.
Also, over-interrogation can lead to legal actors reinforcing problematic definitions of identity. For example, both the Mockeviciene
and Fuller courts constructed factually incorrect and overly restrictive
definitions of lesbian and bisexual identities—the former by holding
that the petitioner was not a lesbian because she had been married to
a man and hadn’t been in a relationship with a woman and the latter
by holding that the petitioner was not bisexual because of his relationships with women.405 In the context of sex, requiring that someone has
certain sex characteristics to change their legal sex designation or play
sex-segregated sports helps construct and reinforce the dominant narrative that is sex binary, fixed, and defined by certain body parts. As
discussed, this construction of legal sex has many harmful consequences for transgender and intersex people, but also for cisgender
people through its role in reinforcing restrictive sex stereotypes.406

RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, RHETORIC 194 (Andreas von Arnauld, Kerstin
von der Decken & Mart Susi eds., 2020).
403. IDAHO CODE § 33-6203(3); Hecox v. Little, 479 F. Supp. 3d 930, 985–87 (D.
Idaho 2020) (holding that the Act subjects students who try out for the girls’ soccer
team “to the possibility of embarrassment, harassment, and invasion of privacy
through having to verify her sex” and that “[s]uch violations are irreparable”).
404. See, e.g., Evancho v. Pine–Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 294 (W.D.
Pa. 2017) (describing how exclusion of transgender students from restrooms that
matched their identity “caus[ed] them genuine distress, anxiety, discomfort[,] and
humiliation”).
405. See generally Mockeviciene v U.S. Att’y Gen., 237 F. App’x 569, 570 (11th Cir.
2007); Fuller v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Robinson, supra note
27, at 1314 (making a similar argument about how jail officials’ determinations regarding inmates sexuality reflect and create narrow and problematic definitions of gay
identity).
406. See supra Subsection IV.B.3. As mentioned, I will explore these harms, and
others flowing from over-interrogation of identity, in my future work.
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article understands identity adjudication as a legal phenomenon operating across identities and areas of law and has attempted to
make sense of this phenomenon by developing a taxonomy through
which to understand the factors legal actors use to determine someone’s identity—factors that these actors are not making explicit and/or
even consciously using. Examining identity adjudication in this broad
way reveals systemic problems with how legal actors understand and
adjudicate identity. This Article has examined one of those
problems—a context-detached approach to determining identity—
and offered an alternative—a context-informed approach. Rather
than approaching identity as a stable fact or characteristic about
someone, legal actors should begin by asking why identity matters to
the law in the first place. Perhaps a particular legal rule does not require identity adjudication at all (like anti-discrimination law). And if
the legal rule does require determining someone’s identity, the definition of identity and the proof requirements of an identity claim should
be informed by the purpose of the specific law at hand. A contextinformed approach would also bring identity adjudication to the surface and force legal actors to make the fact of, and their reasoning
behind, identity adjudication explicit. Additionally, because the law
would be disciplining the identity inquiry, there would be less room
for legal actors’ subjective or conscious ideas, biases, and stereotypes
about particular identities to taint the identity determination.
This is not to say that context-informed identity adjudication will
always produce just, fair, or equitable results. The normative value of
context-informed identity adjudication is tied to the normative value
of the law at issue. For example, a context-informed approach to adjudicating identity for a law that limits citizenship to only those individuals who qualify as “white” would produce outcomes that further
entrench racial subordination. However, adopting a context-informed
approach would limit the normative assessment to the purpose of the
law and would eliminate many of the problems that flow from legal
actors making identity determinations based on their own subjective
ideas about identity rather than the particular law at issue.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-2\TWL206.txt

unknown

Seq: 80

10-MAR-22

14:18

